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I. Preliminary Considerations
The absorption of classical intellectual property law into international economic
law will gradually establish universal minimum standards' governing the relations
between innovators and second comers in an integrated world market.2 This
author's previous articles focused on the broader legal and economic implications
of this trend.3 The object here is to convey a more detailed and comprehensive
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1. For a perceptive analysis of the conditions favoring the growth of universal legal standards
generally, see Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 543-50
(1993) (stressing "central role" of multilateral forums "in the creation and shaping of contemporary
international law" and the ability of these forums to "move the solutions substantially towards
acquiring the status of international law").
2. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT 's Uruguay Round: Competitive
Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 173-78, 254-66 (1993) [hereinafter Reichman, TRIPS Component].
For background to these negotiations, see also J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International
Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 751-68
(1989) [hereinafter Reichman, GATT Connection]. See generally GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard
Schricker eds., 1989) [hereinafter GATT OR WIPO]; Symposium: Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223 (pt. I), 689 (pt. II) (1989).
3. See generally Reichman, TRIPS Component, supra note 2; J.H. Reichman, Beyond the
Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights and International
Trade After the GATT's Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75 (1993) [hereinafter Reichman,
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picture of all the important substantive provisions contained in the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),4
as finalized at Marrakech, Morocco, on April 15, 1994.
A. LOGIC OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Among the many causes of the drive to overcome preexisting territorial limita-
tions on intellectual property rights,5 two merit attention here. First, the growing
capacity of manufacturers in developing countries to penetrate distant markets
for traditional industrial products has forced the developed countries to rely more
heavily on their comparative advantages in the production of intellectual goods
than in the past. Second, the rise of knowledge-based industries radically altered
the nature of competition and disrupted the equilibrium that had resulted from
more traditional comparative advantages. Not only is the cost of research and
development often disproportionately higher than in the past, but the resulting
innovation embodied in today's high-tech products has increasingly become more
vulnerable to free-riding appropriators. 6 Market access for developing countries
thus constituted a bargaining chip to be exchanged for greater protection of intel-
lectual goods within a restructured global marketplace. 7
Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights and Trade]. See also J.H. Reichman, Implications
of the Draft TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries as Competitors in an Integrated World
Market, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Discussion Paper No. 73, UNCTAD/
OSG/DP/73, Nov. 1993 [hereinafter Reichman, TRIPS and Developing Countries].
4. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, done at Marrakech, Morocco, April 15, 1994 [hereinafter Final Act], reprinted in THE RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 2-3 (GATT
Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND]; Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC: Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement],
reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra, at 6-19, 365-403. For congressional approval,
see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465 [H.R. 5110], Dec. 8, 1994 [hereinafter
URAA], §§ 101-103 (authorizing President to accept Uruguay Round Agreements and implement
WTO Agreement, supra, art. VIII; but denying treaty status and domestic legal effect to Uruguay
Round Agreements as such, and excluding private actions under those Agreements).
5. See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of
TRIPS Dispute Settlement?, 29 INT'L LAW. 99 (1995) [hereinafter Geller, TRIPS Dispute Settlement]
(stressing difficulties of localizing single territorial jurisdiction even for purposes of national treatment
under current conditions of transnational production and exploitation of intellectual property; and
noting risk of market-distorting solutions in absence of international agreements); see also Paul
Edward Geller, The Universal Electronic Archive: Issues in International Copyright, 25 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. [I.I.C.] 54, 55-56 (1994).
6. See generally J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2443, 2511-19 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal Hybrids]. See also
Paulo Roberto de Almeida, The "New" Intellectual Property Regime and Its Economic Impact
on Developing Countries, in LIBERALIZATION OF SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF GATT 74-76 (Giorgio Sacerdoti ed., 1990) [hereinafter LIBERALIZATION IN
THE URUGUAY ROUND].
7. See, e.g., David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights: The Issues
in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 895-96 (1989); Friedl Weiss, TRIPS in Search of
an Itinerary: Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights and the Uruguay Round Negotiations, in
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In response to these challenges, the TRIPS Agreement mandates mostly time-
tested, basic norms of international intellectual property law as enshrined in the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, last revised in 1967,
and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, last
revised in 1971,8 or in certain domestic institutions, such as laws protecting
confidential information, that all developed legal systems recognize in one form
or another. 9 It also leaves notable gaps and loopholes that will offset some of
the gains accruing from the exercise, especially with respect to nontraditional
objects of intellectual property protection. In this respect, "both the strengths and
weaknesses of the TRIPS Agreement stem from its essentially backwards-looking
character."' 0 To the extent that the TRIPS Agreement significantly elevates the
level of protection beyond that found in existing conventions, as certainly occurs
with respect to patents, for example, the developing countries are usually afforded
safeguards that few would have predicted at the outset of the negotiations. "
Nevertheless, both developed and developing countries guarantee that detailed
''enforcement procedures as specified in this [Agreement] are available under
their national laws,"12 and they all become liable to dispute-settlement machinery
for claims of nullification and impairment of benefits that can lead to cross-sectoral
trade sanctions. 13
B. BASIC PRINCIPLES
Perhaps the most important "basic principle' ' 14 that applies virtually across
the board is that of national treatment of (that is, nondiscrimination against)
LIBERALIZATION IN THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 6, at 87, 109; see also Frederick M. Abbott,
Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT
Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989); Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting
United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273
(1991).
8. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts 1(3), 2, 9(1); Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583,
828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
9. See infra text accompanying notes 250-62.
10. J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in TRIPS: Why Software Fared Badly, and What Are
the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. (Symposium Issue forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter
Reichman, Know-How Gap in TRIPS]. See further infra text accompanying notes 81-106, 191-218.
11. Cf., e.g., Hars Ullrich, GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade, and Develop-
ment, in GATT OR WIPO, supra note 2, at 187 (criticizing maximalist objectives of early initiatives);
Reichman, GATTConnection, supra note 2, at 869-91 (defending the goal of harmonizing minimum-
not maximum-standards that had achieved broad consensus).
12. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 41-50; see also Monique L. Cordray, GATT v.
WIPO, 76 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 121, 135 (1994) (stating that "[p]erhaps the most signifi-
cant milestone in TRIPS is the enforcement provisions").
13. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 63-64. See further infra text accompanying notes
311-26.
14. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 1-8, which collectively comprise "Part I-General
Provisions and Basic Principles."
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foreign rights holders.' 5 This principle of equal treatment under the domestic
laws is then carried over to relations between states in the most-favored-nation
(MFN) provisions of article 4. 16 The latter article ostensibly prevents one member
country from offering a better intellectual property deal than is required by interna-
tional law 17 to nationals of a second member country and then denying similar
advantages to the nationals of other member countries.
Taken together, the national treatment and MFN provisions attempt to rectify
the damage that some states recently inflicted on the international intellectual
property system by unilaterally asserting claims of material reciprocity with re-
spect to hybrid legal regimes falling in the penumbra between the Paris and Berne
Conventions. ' 8 In practice, however, certain express limitations could diminish
the effectiveness of these basic requirements. For example, while the national
treatment and MFN clauses both apply "with regard to the protection of intellec-
tual property,"' 9 it turns out that, for purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, the
term "intellectual property" refers only to seven of the eight subject-matter
categories enumerated in sections 1 through 7 of part II. These include (1) copy-
rights and related rights; (2) trademarks and (3) geographical indications; (4)
industrial designs; (5) patents; (6) integrated circuit designs; and (7) trade secrets
or confidential information. 20 As regards neighboring rights covered by the Inter-
national Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome Convention),2' national treatment and the
15. See id. art. 3(1) (requiring each member to accord the nationals of other member states
"treatment no less favorable . . . with regard to the protection of intellectual property" than each
state accords to its own nationals (emphasis supplied)). For this purpose (and that of the MFN clause
as well, see infra note 16 and accompanying text), "protection" is broadly defined to include "matters
affecting . . . availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property
rights as well as . . .matters affecting the use of [such] rights specifically addressed" in the TRIPS
Agreement. Id. art. 3(1) n.3. However, the requirement of national treatment is expressly subject
to exceptions already provided in the Paris and Berne Conventions, supra note 8, and to exceptions
recognized in both the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, adopted at Rome, Italy, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S.
43 [hereinafter Rome Convention] and in the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated
Circuits, opened for signature at Washington, D.C., May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477 [hereinafter
IPIC Treaty]. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 1(3) n. 1, 3(1). The United States is not a
party to the Rome Convention.
16. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 4.
17. Cf. id. art. 1(1) (allowing member states to "implement in their [domestic] law more extensive
protection than is required by this Agreement").
18. See, e.g., Thomas Dreier, National Treatment, Reciprocity and Retorsion-The Case of
Computer Programs and Integrated Circuits, in GATT OR WIPO, supra note 2, at 63, 70-73;
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2448-55, 2500-04.
19. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 3(1), 4.
20. See id. arts. 1(2), 9-40. The eighth (and presumably exempted) subject-matter category
mentioned in Part II of the Agreement is entitled "Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual
Licenses;" see infra text accompanying notes 264-77.
21. See Rome Convention, supra note 15.
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MFN clause apply only to those rights that the TRIPS Agreement selectively
provides, but not to rights generally flowing from that Convention. 2
The precise mesh of these provisions remains to be seen, but the following
overall framework seems plausible. First, international intellectual property
treaties existing at the time that the TRIPS Agreement takes effect 23 are gener-
ally immunized from the MFN clause (but not the national treatment clause
except as expressly provided) under a grandfather provision within the TRIPS
Agreement, which only this Agreement can override.24 Second, existing and
future agreements establishing "customs unions and free-trade areas" of a
regional character may, to varying degrees, be immunized from applying MFN
treatment, and possibly national treatment, to some non-TRIPS-mandated in-
tellectual property measures affecting intra-regional adherents, at least insofar
as past practice under article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade is carried over to the WTO Agreement and applied to intellectual
property rights.25 Third, states otherwise contemplating unilateral measures
to protect intellectual property rights in the future must generally weigh the
costs and benefits of nonreciprocity2 6 with respect to other WTO member
countries, unless the measures contemplated fall outside the seven categories
of "intellectual property" recognized by the TRIPS Agreement27 and outside
22. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 3(1), 4(b).
23. See Final Act, supra note 4, para. 3 (setting Jan. 1, 1995, as target date for entry into force,
if possible); WTO Agreement, supra note 4, arts. VIII, XIV; see also URAA, supra note 4, § 101(b)
(authorizing President to implement WTO Agreement after determining that "a sufficient number
of foreign countries are accepting the obligations of the Uruguay Round Agreements").
24. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 4(d) (with the proviso that immunized measures
"not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against nationals of other members");
see also id. art. 4(b) (exempting inconsistent provisions of Berne Convention, supra note 8, and
Rome Convention, supra note 15).
25. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (as amended through 1994) [hereinafter GATT
1947], art. XXIV, reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 4, at 485, 522-25;
WTO Agreement, supra note 4, Annex IA: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods-General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 1, reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra
note 4, at 20-21 [hereinafter GATT 1994] (incorporating by reference GATT 1947, supra, art.
XXIV); see also GATT 1994, supra, Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,
supra note 4, at 31-34. An analysis of Article XXIV lies beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless,
it suggests the possibility that advantages created under the North American Free Trade Agreement
[hereinafter NAFTA] ch. 17 (Intellectual Property), 32 I.L.M. 612, 670, that are not covered by
TRIPS need not be granted to non-NAFTA countries that are parties of the WTO Agreement, supra
note 4. See also RICHARD E. NEFF & FRAN SMALLSON, NAFTA-PROTECTING AND ENFORCING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN NORTH AMERICA 1-16 (1994).
26. See Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 2, at 844-48 ("functional implications of
non-reciprocity").
27. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. On this reading, the TRIPS Agreement would
appear to override unilateral claims to material reciprocity like those incorporated into the United
Kingdom's unregistered design right of 1988 (see Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch.
48, §§ 213-264 [hereinafter CDPA]; see also MICHAEL F. FLINT ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-
THE NEW LAW 151 (1989) (construing CDPA, supra, § 256, to require material reciprocity)) and
into the United States' Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA) (Pub. L. No. 98-620,
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the residual national treatment clauses of the Paris and Berne Conventions.2 8
Whether any specific measures that were arguably not cognizable under existing
conventions, such as the European Union's proposed regime to protect electronic
data bases29 or certain levies for private copying of audio and visual recordings
like those implemented in France,3° may escape the MFN and national treatment
clauses of the TRIPS Agreement will thus depend on a variety of factors. These
include evolving state practice with respect to regional trade agreements and the
extent to which decision makers interpret "intellectual property" as narrowly
defining the seven categories of subject matter to be protected or as broadly
defining certain modalities of protection. 31 It may also depend on who interprets
these clauses, given the uncertain jurisdictional and substantive powers of the
WTO panels to be established under binding dispute-resolution procedures set
out in the TRIPS Agreement.32 In any event, the drafters seem to have built in
some incentives for states contemplating new protectionist measures to seek to
address their needs within the framework of ongoing multilateral discussions
affecting barriers to trade in general. 3
98 Stat. 3335, 3347 (1984) (codified in ch. 2, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901,902(a)(1)(A)-(C), 913,914 (1988);
see also Charles R. McManis, International Protection for Semiconductor Chip Designs and the
Standard of Judicial Review of Presidential Proclamations Issued Pursuant to the Semiconductor
Chip Protection of 1984, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 331 (1988); Dreier, supra note 8,
at 70-73). This follows because industrial designs and integrated circuit designs fall within the operative
definition of intellectual property. See supra notes 19-21. In practice, the need for reciprocity under
the SCPA was obviated by TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 35-38, which harmonize the
protection of integrated circuit designs. See infra text accompanying notes 222-31.
28. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 2(1) and 9(1), respectively incorporating by
reference Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(1), and Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(1);
see also Andr6 Kerever, Le GA7T et le droit d 'auteur international, 47 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT COMMERCIAL 629, 641 (1994).
29. See Commission of the European Communities Amended Proposal for a Council Directive
on the Legal Protection of Databases, COM(93)464 final-SYN at 393; see also Reichman, Legal
Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2493-98.
30. See, e.g., NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 25, at 16 (noting denial by France of royalties
from audio and video levies, under 1985 Act, to producers and performers where the initial fixation
of the production did not occur in France, subject to agreements on reciprocity).
31. The author is indebted to Paul Geller for this flexible reading of "intellectual property."
See also Kerever, supra note 28, at 642 (arguing that royalties for private copies of audio and visual
recordings fall outside the TRIPS Agreement, whatever their status under other conventions). For
parallel tensions concerning application of the national treatment rule under the Paris Convention,
compare Reichman, GAIT Connection, supra note 2, at 848-54 (stressing broad definition of industrial
property as key to application of national treatment under Paris Convention, supra note 8, arts.
1(3), 2(1)) with Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, The United States Proposal for a GAT Agreement on
Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 22 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 273-77 (arguing that national treatment is limited to modalities of industrial
property protection specifically mentioned in Paris Convention, art. 1(2), and no others).
32. See, e.g., Geller, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 5, at 104-07; infra text accompanying
notes 313-15.
33. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 68-69, 71(1); infra text accompanying notes
298-309. If so,_.this weakens the presumption that intellectual property protection was reserved for
domestic law, as provided in GATT 1947, supra note 25, art. XX(d). See generally Reichman,
GAT Connection, supra note 2, at 828-43 (interpreting ambiguities of GATT's art. XX(d)).
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Beyond these equal-treatment obligations, states must accord to the nationals
of other member states those international minimum standards of intellectual
property protection that are comprised within "the treatment provided for
in this [TRIPS] Agreement." 34 One component of this "TRIPS treatment"
consists of the basic substantive provisions of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, of the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, 35 and of the Treaty on Intellectual Property
in Respect of Integrated Circuits (IPIC Treaty) 36 The other component consists
of minimum standards that the TRIPS Agreement applies irrespective of preex-
isting international norms and sometimes at the expense of those norms.37 In
either case, the relevant standards "are integral parts of this WTO Agreement,
binding on all members." 3"
The member states have also agreed to recognize certain fundamental objectives
and principles, such as the "promotion of technological innovation" and the
legitimacy of public interest exceptions to intellectual property rights generally.3 9
These provisions, of capital importance for developing countries, are discussed
below.
II. Primary Intellectual Property Regimes:
Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights
A. PATENTS
In the course of multilateral negotiations to revise the Paris Convention that
preceded the Uruguay Round, the developed countries sought to elevate its rudi-
mentary standards concerning patentable inventions while the developing coun-
tries demanded preferential measures that would have weakened even the preex-
isting obligations that states owed foreign inventors under their domestic laws. 40
The TRIPS Agreement breaks this impasse and fills many of the gaps in the
international patent system with uniform minimum standards of protection that
reflect the practices of the developed countries. The TRIPS Agreement also
establishes new rules governing permissible limitations on the foreign patentee's
34. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 1(3). Part II of the Agreement as a whole is entitled
"Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property Rights." See RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 4, at 370.
35. See supra note 8.
36. See IPIC Treaty, supra note 15; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 35.
37. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 1(3) (TRIPS treatment), 9(1) (mandating
compliance with substantive provisions of Berne Convention, supra note 8, except for art. 6bis
concerning moral rights).
38. WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. 11(2) (distinguishing "Multilateral Trade Agreements,"
including TRIPS, that are binding on all members from "Plurilateral Trade Agreements," see id.
art. 11(3), which create obligations only for members that have accepted them).
39. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 7, 8(1).
40. See Reichman, GA77 Connection, supra note 2, at 816-18, 817 n.315.
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scope of protection, and these rules reflect compromise efforts by both sides to
balance private and public interests.
1. Normative Structure
The developed countries scored major achievements in elevating and harmoniz-
ing minimum standards of patent protection, especially with regard to basic crite-
ria of eligibility and duration, which the Paris Convention had not addressed.
The following provisions are noteworthy:
(1) Member states may not exclude any field of technology from patentability
as a whole, and they may not discriminate as to the place of invention
when rights are granted.41
(2) The domestic patent laws (including that of the United States) must provide
a uniform term of twenty years of protection from the filing date, such
protection must depend on uniform conditions of eligibility, and specified
exclusive rights must be granted.42
(3) The patentees' bundle of exclusive rights must include the right to supply
the market with imports of the patented products.43
(4) Logically, the obligation to work patents locally under article 5A of the
Paris Convention appears overridden by the right to supply imports, at
least in principle."4
These achievements build on standards previously established by the Paris
Convention, such as the rights of priority,45 which even WTO members who do
41. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27(1) (providing that "patents shall be available
• . . without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products
are imported or locally produced"). This necessitated at least one change in U.S. law and practice
under 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988), which discriminates on the basis of the country of invention for
purposes of establishing the date of invention and the first inventor. See URAA, supra note 4,
§ 531 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988)); Craig P. Opperman, GATT, WIPO Herald Changes to
U.S. Patent Law, 6 J. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 8 (1994). Query whether 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988)
will also require modification.
Some exclusions from patentability remain permissible, for example "diagnostic, therapeutic and
surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals," and inventions adversely affecting life,
health, or the environment. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 27(2), (3)(a). For permissible
exclusions of inventions affecting animals and, to a lesser extent, plants, see infra text accompanying
notes 82-97.
42. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 27, 28, 33; see also URAA, supra note 4, § 532
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) to extend the duration of patents from 17 years to 20 years from
the date of application) and § 533 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988)) (clarifying that unauthorized
imports and offers to sell constitute infringement); Opperman, supra note 4 1. To qualify, an invention
must be "new, involve an inventive step," and be "capable of industrial application"; the latter
terms are made expressly equivalent to nonobviousness and utility. See TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 4, art. 27(1) n.5.
43. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 28(1). Questions bearing on international exhaustion
of patent rights are left unaddressed. See id. arts. 6, 28(8) n.6.
44. See id. arts. 27(1), 28(1); cf. Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 5A; G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN,
GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROP-
ERTY AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967, at 67-73 (1968).
45. See Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 4A(1).
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not adhere to this Convention must now respect.46 Single countries may deviate
from these universal patent-law standards only to the extent that they benefit
from longer or shorter periods of transitional relief, which vary with the beneficia-
ry's status as either a "developing country" or a "least-developed country
(LDC)." 47
For example, developing countries may postpone implementing most of the
required standards for a period of at least five years, and even ten years with
respect to fields of technology previously excluded under their domestic patent
laws. 48 LDCs obtain a reprieve for ten years, while a showing of hardship may
qualify them for further delays and other concessions.4 9 Nevertheless, a pipeline
provision, clarified at the last minute, safeguards existing pharmaceutical and
agrochemical patents, which, if otherwise eligible, must obtain at least five years
of exclusive marketing rights even in those developing countries that did not
previously grant patents in these fields. 50
Because inventors in developed countries are eventually entitled to obtain and
enforce patents everywhere, competitive pressures in developing countries ought
to shift from subject-matter exclusions of patentability to scope of protection
issues bearing on single patents, as occurs in developed countries. Firms in
developing countries may thus exploit disclosed information in order to work
around the claimed inventions as well as any unpatented know-how they fairly
obtain, whether disclosed or not. 51 The lack of international standards defining the
doctrine of equivalents affords additional room in which to maneuver. 2 Arguably,
46. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 2(1) (requiring compliance with Paris Convention,
supra note 8, arts. 1-12, 19); see also Jorg Reinbothe & Anthony Howard, The State of Play in the
Negotiations on TRIPS (GATT/Uruguay Round), 13 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. [E.I.P.R.] 157, 158-59
(1991).
47. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 65(1), (2), 66. However, all members must
respect the national treatment and MFN requirements from the date that the WTO Agreement, supra
note 4, enters into force. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 65(1), (2), 66(1).
48. See id. arts. 65(1), (2), (4).
49. See id. art. 66(1) (allowing WTO's Council for TRIPS to authorize further extensions); see
also WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XI(2) (requiring LDCs "only ... to undertake commitments
and concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs
or their administrative and institutional capabilities." The principle of differential and more favorable
treatment for least-developed countries (as distinct from developing countries under United Nations
practice) was thus reinforced at the last moment. Cf. Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 2,
at 816-22, 864-74.
50. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 70(8), (9); supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Logically, these pipeline safeguards for existing pharmaceutical and agricultural patents would not
apply to least developed countries, which are otherwise exempt from implementing the agreed patent
standards for ten years. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
51. However, laws protecting confidential information must now be respected. See infra text
accompanying notes 250-52.
52. Cf. HAROLD L. WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION-BY TREATY OR DOMESTIc REFORM
24-26, 192-214 (1993); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
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states may also apply a broad experimental use exception so long as the rights
holders are notified. 3
The extent to which developing countries will themselves benefit from stronger
patent systems-as distinct from compensatory market access-depends in part on
the willingness of firms in developed countries either to increase direct investments
in developing countries or to license more of their advanced technology to local
firms. Moreover, familiarization with the benefits of the patent system could stimu-
late greater investment in domestic research and development and should encour-
age the private sector to develop its own intellectual property .54 Nevertheless, the
value of a patent system to developing countries remains controversial,55 and single
developing countries could suffer hardship because of a growing dependence on
foreign patents with few countervailing benefits. In such a case, one must acknowl-
edge the achievements of the developing-country negotiators, who have built nu-
merous safeguards and escape hatches into the TRIPS Agreement.
2. Limits of the Patentee's Exclusive Rights
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement declares that states should tolerate only
"limited exceptions to the exclusive rights" that article 28 confers.5 6 But other
articles permit exceptions to the exclusive rights when needed "to protect public
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital impor-
tance" to economic development;5 7 to prevent "abuse of intellectual property
rights," including the imposition of unreasonable commercial terms;5" and to
counteract unreasonable trade restraints and practices that "adversely affect the
international transfer of technology." 59 Governments may also attempt to invoke
language in article 7 that envisions the effective transfer and dissemination of
53. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 30, 3 1(b), (c); cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents
and the Progress of Science; Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017
(1989).
54. See generally Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights
and the GATT: A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989); Keith E. Maskus,
Intellectual Property, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND: A RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH
TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 164, 165, 168-69 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1990) [hereinafter
COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND]; see also Frances Stewart, Technology Transfer for Develop-
ment, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY-LESSONS FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 301,322-23 (R.E. Even-
son & G. Ranis eds., 1990).
55. For particularly negative views, see, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System
and Third World Development: Reality or Myth, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831 (1987); Arvind Subramanian,
The International Economics of Intellectual Property Protection: A Welfare-Theoretic Trade Policy
Analysis, 19 WORLD DEV. 945 (1991). But see Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Issues: The Uruguay Round Agreement and Its Economic Implications, paper presented
to the World Bank Conference on the Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, Washington,
D.C., Jan. 26-27, 1995, at 50 (more optimistic about long-term prospects).
56. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 28, 30.
57. Id. art. 8(1).
58. Id. arts. 8(2), 31(b).
59. Id. arts. 8(2), 40.
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technology among member countries and the maintenance of social and economic
welfare as further grounds for regulatory action limiting grants of exclusive rights
in appropriate circumstances. 60 These and other articles thus preserve, and may
even expand, preexisting grounds for limiting a patentee's exclusive rights under
article 5A of the Paris Convention, 61 which some developed-country delegations
had hoped to abrogate.
a. Compulsory Licenses in General
The standard form of remedial action remains compulsory licensing, as it was
under article 5A of the Paris Convention, subject to important refinements and
conditions that article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement attempts to introduce. 62 In
principle, both the public-interest exception and measures to prevent abuse, re-
spectively stipulated in articles 8(1) and 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, could
justify resort to compulsory licensing.63 In the past, however, arguments about
the meaning of "abuse" engendered considerable controversy. A few developed
countries, notably the United States, limited the concept to anticompetitive prac-
tices bordering on antitrust violations. 64 Most other countries-and a leading
commentator-considered the doctrine of abuse applicable if a patentee fails to
work the patent locally in due course or "refuses to grant licenses on reasonable
terms and thereby hampers industrial development, or does not supply the national
market with sufficient quantities of the patented product, or demands excessive
prices for such products."
65
The TRIPS Agreement merges this broader concept of abuse with the public-
interest exception for purposes of compulsory licensing under article 31.66
However, considerable effort has been made to discredit the nonworking of
foreign patents locally as a sufficient basis for triggering such licenses.67 The
TRIPS Agreement then subjects all nonexclusive compulsory licenses sound-
60. Id. art. 7.
61. See Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 5A; BODENHAUSEN, supra note 44, at 67-73. Even
forfeiture or revocation of the offending patent under the conditions set out in art. 5A of the Paris
Convention remains technically feasible, subject to an opportunity for judicial review. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 4, art. 32; Paris Convention, supra note 4, art. 5A(l), (3); BODENHAUSEN,
supra note 44, at 70 (distinguishing measures required by the public interest from measures to prevent
abuse and contending that legislation pertaining to the public interest was not even subject to the
patentees' safeguards under art. 5A(3), (4) of the Paris Convention). But states that resort to this
remedy in any but the most exceptional circumstances should expect to elicit protests under the
TRIPS dispute settlement framework. See Reichman, TRIPS Component, supra note 2, at 258-63.
62. Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 31, with Paris Convention, supra note 8,
art. 5A.
63. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 8(1), (2), 31.
64. See, e.g., Leo J. Raskind, Licensing under United States Antitrust Law, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 49 (1994); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1815 (1984).
65. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 44, at 71.
66. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 8(1), (2), 31.
67. See supra notes 43-44, 61-65 and accompanying text.
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ing in any of the bases established by articles 8(1) and 8(2) to the conditions
of article 31.
So long as the grounds for triggering a nonexclusive compulsory license are
rooted in the broad notion of "abuse" under article 8(1), say, because of public-
interest considerations or because the patentee refused to authorize the desired
use "on reasonable commercial terms and conditions," 68 article 31 requires the
would-be licensee to seek a negotiated license from the right holder, and failing
this, to pay equitable compensation. 69 The victorious licensee could not normally
export the products resulting from use of the patent under such a compulsory
license.7 ° Nor could the licensee exclude the foreign patentee from subsequently
working the patent locally-in direct competition with the former-once the latter
had rectified any grievances that might have justified issuance of a compulsory
license in the first place.7
In contrast, a complainant who seeks a compulsory license under article 8(2)
to rectify abuse of a patent in the narrow, technical sense familiar from United
States law will remain exempt from both the duty to negotiate and restrictions
on exports, provided that some judicial or administrative authority deems the
patentee's conduct anticompetitive.7 2 In such a case, "the need to correct anti-
competitive practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of
remuneration" the patentee will receive.1
3
The sole exception to the compulsory licensing scheme available under article
3 1 is for patented "semi-conductor technology." Article 31 (c), as revised at the
last minute, now limits the granting of compulsory licenses for "other use" of
such technology to instances of "public non-commercial use" or to situations
in which the compulsory license obviates judicially determined" anti-competitive
practices." 7 4 Whether unpatented semiconductor layout designs subject to inte-
grated circuit laws are also immunized from compulsory licenses for "other use"
remains to be clarified, as discussed below.75 In any event, these provisions
68. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3 1(b); see also id. art. 8(1).
69. Id. art. 31(b)-(j) (also requiring judicial review and nonassignability).
70. Id. art. 31(f).
71. Id. art. 31(d). This was a bone of contention in pre-GATT negotiations.
72. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 31(k). Whether these exemptions will apply to
any given compulsory license, however, could still depend on unsound distinctions between "public
interest" and "abuse," on the one hand, and "anti-competitive practices" on the other. For example,
if a government authorizes a compulsory license because the patentee refused to rectify exorbitant
prices, is this either a public interest exception under art. 8(1) or the type of abuse otherwise subject
to all the limitations of art. 31(b)-O), or is this an anticompetitive practice within the less restrictive
regime of art. 31 (k)? To complicate matters further, article 8(2) empowers developing countries to
adopt appropriate measures to deal with abusive licensing practices that "adversely affect the interna-
tional transfer of technology." See further infra text accompanying notes 263-77.
73. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 31(k). The use of compulsory licenses for the exploita-
tion of dependent patents is also regulated. See id. art. 31(1).
74. Id. art. 31(c).
75. See id. arts. 35, 37(2); infra text accompanying notes 227-31.
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make it harder for interested parties in developing countries to start up local
semiconductor industries by persuading their governments to seize foreign semi-
conductor technologies in the name of overriding public interest.
76
On balance, article 31 helps to insulate foreign patentees from confiscatory prac-
tices that earlier proposals to reform article 5A of the Paris Convention appeared
to tolerate, while it affords the developing countries broad grounds for curbing
conduct that seriously compromises their national development strategies. Apart
from semiconductor technologies, the requirement that would-be compulsory li-
censees negotiate seriously with rights holders to obtain exclusive licenses on rea-
sonable terms should increase the pressure on foreign patentees to accommodate
pricing and other strategies to local market conditions. This, in turn, should lessen
the need for governments to seek compulsory licensing in the first instance.
b. New Dimensions of the Public-Interest Exception
Beyond traditional notions of "public interest" and "abuse," the TRIPS
Agreement introduces new and more expansive concepts whose outer limits have
yet to be delineated at the international level. In particular, article 7 stresses the
"promotion of technological innovation and. . . the transfer and dissemination
of technology . . . in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare."
Article 8(1) expands potential public-interest exceptions to sectors other than
public health and nutrition that are "of vital importance to . . . socio-economic
and technological development," and article 8(2) seeks to ensure "the interna-
tional transfer of technology." 77 In addition, article 66 underscores the LDCs'
''need for flexibility to create a viable technological base," and it must be read
in conjunction with the other provisions favoring this group of countries. 78
All these provisions arm developing and least-developed countries with legal
grounds for maintaining a considerable degree of domestic control over intellec-
tual property policies in a post-TRIPS environment, including the imposition of
compulsory licenses within article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and article 5A
of the Paris Convention.79 While the meaning of any particular clause must emerge
from evolving state practice, taken together they clearly sanction public-interest
exceptions of importance to the developing countries while rejecting the more
extreme measures these countries proposed during the Paris Revision process. sO
76. Cf. Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property in the Field of Integrated Circuits: Implications
for Developing Countries, 14 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 83, 84-86 (1990) (stressing
barriers to entering semiconductor chip production for firms in developing countries).
77. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 7, 8(1), (2); see also infra text accompanying
notes 322-27 (correlation with dispute resolution procedures).
78. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 66(1); supra note 49 (quoting WTO Agreement,
supra note 4, art. XI(2)).
79. Until a WTO dispute-settlement panel, see infra text accompanying notes 313-15, determines
the extent, if any, to which Paris Convention art. 5A remains outside the purview of TRIPS Agreement
art. 31, states seeking to impose compulsory licenses on patentees without respecting the safeguards
of art. 31 bear a heavy and risky burden.
80. See Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 2, at 817 n.315 (citing authorities).
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Eventually, specific public-interest safeguards essential to national economic de-
velopment will have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis, in order to deal
with particular complaints about the socially harmful effects of technological
dependency that are not offset by enhanced market access, and the resulting
compromises are likely to give both sides less than they want.
3. Nontraditional Subject Matters
The principle weakness of the TRIPS Agreement stems from "the drafters' tech-
nical inability and political reluctance to address the problems facing innovators
and investors at work on important new technologies in an Age of Information."s'
This shortcoming particularly affects biotechnology and computer programs.
a. Biotechnology and Plant Varieties
In establishing the patentability of biogenetically engineered products, article
27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement follows the European Patent Convention of
1973 and not the more protectionist approach of U.S. law. s2 As a result, adherents
to TRIPS must generally provide patent protection for microorganisms and for
"nonbiological and microbiological processes," 83 on the doubtful premise that
the patenting of microorganisms and microbiological processes does not entail
the protection of life forms. In the same vein, states need not allow the patenting
of higher organisms, whether plant or animal, nor must they protect "essentially
biological processes for the production of plants or animals."8 4
However, a state that excludes plants from its domestic patent law must protect
plant varieties under a sui generis legal regime,85 such as the United States Plant
Variety Protection Act.86 This Act, as adopted in 1970, was modeled on the
81. Reichman, Know-How Gap in TRIPS, supra note 10; see also Lisa B. Martin & Susan L.
Amster, International Intellectual Property Protections in the New GATTAccord, 6 J. PROP. RIGHTS
9 (1994) (noting "serious flaws" limiting patentability of many biotechnical products).
82. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27(3)(b); cf. Convention on the Law of European
Patents art. 53(b), opened for signature Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270, art. 53(b) [hereinafter European
Patents Convention]. See generally GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 334-42 (1992). In the United States, patent
protection is available, at least in principle, for nearly all products of biogenetic engineering, including
asexually propagated plant varieties and some biogenetically developed animal varieties. See, e.g.,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); 1 IVER P. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
ch. 6 (1993) ("Utility Patent Protection of Plant and Animal Varieties").
83. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27(3)(b).
84. Id.
85. Id. (requiring protection of plant varieties "either by patents or by an effective sui generis
system or by any combination thereof").
86. Congress provided sui generis protection for novel, sexually propagated plant varieties in
the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, but confined innovative asexually propagated varieties to
plant patents. See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970),
amended by Pub. L. No. 96-574, § 1, 94 Stat. 3350 (1980) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2321-3583 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) [hereinafter PVPA]. The PVPA was further amended in
1994 to conform to higher international minimum standards adopted in 1991. See Pub. L. No.
103-321, 108 Stat. 1793; infra note 87 and accompanying text.
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International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV
Convention),87 and the implication of the relevant TRIPS provision is that states
unwilling to recognize plant patents should at least conform to UPOV Convention
standards. 88 Meanwhile, a 1991 revision of the UPOV Convention elevated these
standards of protection from a modified copyright model to a modified patent
model,8 9 and developed countries, including the United States, have taken steps
to implement these changes in their domestic laws. 90 Whether developing coun-
tries will adhere to the latest version of UPOV remains to be seen.
In general, the line of demarcation between micro and macrobiological ad-
vances is technically unsound, 9' and the application of standard patent-law doc-
trines to biogenetic engineering has proved unsatisfactory.92 Even when patents
become formally available, the scope of protection remains uncertain, while the
now universal standard of nonobviousness93 could leave investors in the most
innovative and commercially valuable applications of scientific know-how to
industry unprotected and increasingly vulnerable to free-riding appropriators. 94
Yet, given the lack of consensus concerning remedial action in either patent law
or sui generis regimes, the TRIPS Agreement leaves the field pretty much as it
stands, with a built-in promise to revisit this topic in four years' time. 95
These ambiguities allow states to exclude the most controversial biogenetic
subject matter, if they so desire,96 and also to opt for sui generis protection of
plant varieties. At the same time, firms in both developed and developing countries
may seek to patent biogenetic innovations abroad that would not be patentable
at home, owing to the lack of agreed international standards. Even determining
87. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, revised
by 33 U.S.T. 2703 (1978) [hereinafter UPOV Convention]. The UPOV Convention was recently
amended and opened for signature in Geneva on March 19, 1991. See International Convention for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, opened for signature Mar. 19, 1991, reprinted in 3 EUR.
PAT. HANDBOOK (MB) ch. 90 [hereinafter UPOV 1991].
88. See supra note 85 (quoting TRIPS language requiring "an effective sui generis system").
89. See UPOV 1991, supra note 87; see also Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2467-70.
90. See supra note 86.
91. See, e.g., R. STEPHEN CRESPI, PATENTS: A BASIC GUIDE TO PATENTING IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
75-82, 102-11, 152-54 (1988); Rainer Moufang, Protection for Plant Breeding and Plant Varieties-
A Frontier of Patent Law, 23 I.I.C. 328 (1992).
92. See, e.g., CRESPI, supra note 81, at 150-63; John Richards, International Aspects of Patent
Protection for Biotechnology, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 433 (1993); Dan
L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 24-71 (1991); see also JOSEPH STRAUS & RAINER MOUFANG. DEPOSIT
AND RELEASE OF BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL FOR THE PURPOSES OF PATENT PROCEDURE: INDUSTRIAL
AND TANGIBLE PROPERTY ISSUES 41-95, 115-26 (1990).
93. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27(1) n.5.
94. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2471-72, 2511-19; see also infra
text accompanying notes 216-18.
95. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27(3)(b).
96. See, e.g., Martin & Amster, supra note 81 (noting complaints that TRIPS refusal to address
these issues effectively removed "many biotechnical products from the required umbrella of interna-
tional patent protection").
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which strategy best suits particular developing countries will raise hard questions,
especially in view of other incentives that developed country firms may make
available through negotiated arrangements.97
b. Computer Programs
As regards information technologies, the TRIPS Agreement opts for copyright
(and trade secret) protection of computer programs,98 not patent protection, the
availability of which remains unsettled and controversial in most developed coun-
tries. 99 Because the TRIPS provisions do prohibit field-specific exclusions of
patentable subject-matter,"0 one can nonetheless argue that the domestic patent
laws must recognize some program-related inventions if they meet other criteria
of eligibility, including the nonobviousness standard.10' There is, however, even
less consensus concerning the proper application of patent-law doctrines to com-
puter programs than exists with respect to biogenetic engineering.' 0 Hence, any
developed or developing country that disfavors patent protection of computer
software may allow its judicial or administrative authorities to emulate the many
restrictive doctrines and practices recognized by developed legal systems, without
running afoul of its TRIPS obligations.'°3
Perhaps the most accurate conclusion is that the TRIPS Agreement "leaves
both developed and developing countries free to determine the level of patent
protection to be afforded program-related inventions within their domestic juris-
dictions, but not free to impose their. . . [respective] decisions on other member
countries. "14 This lack of reciprocity, in turn, creates unusual strategic opportu-
nities for alert entrepreneurs. For example, the growing reliance on software-
related patents in a few developed countries, notably the United States and Ja-
97. See further Reichman, TRIPS and Developing Countries, supra note 3, at 10-11.
98. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 10(1), 39; infra text accompanying notes 191-218,
250-262.
99. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Mani-
festo Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2361-64
(1994) [hereinafter Samuelson et al., Manifesto]; Henri W. Hanneman, Patentability of Computer
Programs in Europe, in THE LAW OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE 1992: A COMPARISON
WITH THE USA 69-85 (A.P. Meijboom & C. Prins eds., 1991).
100. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
101. See further Reichman, Know-How Gap in TRIPS, supra note 10.
102. Specifically, there is no consensus with respect to judicial exclusions for laws of nature and
naturally occurring phenomena; scientific principles or mathematical formulas; abstract ideas, such
as methods for doing business; mental processes as such; and, in the European Union, for "presenta-
tions of information." Equally unsettled are judicial applications of the novelty and nonobviousness
criteria as well as issues pertaining to scope of protection. See, e.g., Samuelson et al., Manifesto,
supra note 99, at 2343-47 (citing authorities); Hanneman, supra note 99, at 70-85 (citing European
Patents Convention, supra note 82, art. 52(2)); see also Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The
Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions,
39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1032-40, 1083-92, 1122-33 (1990).
103. See supra note 102. See generally Reichman, Know-How Gap in TRIPS, supra note 10, pt.
I.A. ("Computer Program-Related Interventions").
104. Reichman, TRIPS Component, supra note 2, at 202.
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pan, 0 5 means that patentees in those countries may only succeed in excluding
other countries' programs as infringing imports on their own territories. They
cannot stop firms in other countries, including developing-country firms, from
ignoring foreign software patents at home or in third-country markets where such
patents are not recognized. By the same token, producers may opt to patent
software inventions in countries where program-related patents are issued, even
if they could not obtain similar protection at home, under the principles of national
treatment and independence of patents that the Paris Convention imposes on all
TRIPS signatories.' 06
B. TRADEMARKS, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS OF
ORIGIN, AND ANTICOUNTERFEITING MEASURES
From the international legal standpoint, a formal consensus to regulate both
trademarks and geographical indications has long existed under the Paris Conven-
tion.'07 For example, this Convention established basic international minimum
standards governing priority rights'08 and the imposition of compulsory licenses,''09
and it mandated the independence of marks for purposes of domestic adjudica-
tion. 0 In addition, the Paris Convention sets out general provisions concerning
the protection of well-known marks;"'. the assignment of marks;".2 the duty of all
member countries to protect the integrity of marks registered as such in other mem-
ber countries;' 13 the duty to protect service marks, 114 collective marks, ' and trade
names;" 6 and it purports to recognize even a duty to seize imported goods unlaw-
fully bearing trademarks or other false indications of source. "7
In retrospect, the weakness of the international regime governing trademark
protection derived only in part from the failure of key developing countries to
adhere to the Paris Convention (or to its later versions),"8 and mainly from the
105. See supra note 102.
106. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 2(1), 3, 4; Paris Convention, supra note 8, arts.
2(1), 4(bis)(1).
107. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(2), which provides: "The protection of
industrial property has as its object patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service
marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair
competition."
108. See id. art. 4(A)(1), (C)(1) (period of priority for registration of trademarks to be six months).
109. See id. art. 5(C)(1).
110. See id. art. 6.
111. See id. art. 6bis.
112. See id. art. 6quater.
113. See id. art. 6quinquies.
114. See id. art. 6sexies.
115. See id. art. 7bis.
116. See id. art. 8.
117. See id. arts. 9, 10, l0ter.
118. See, e.g., Piatti, Measures to Combat International Piracy, 11 E.I.P.R. 239, 242 (1989)
(nonmembers include key developing countries in Southeast Asia, notably India, Latin America,
and the Middle East, plus countries such as Brazil, that adhere to less protective versions of the
Paris Convention).
SUMMER 1995
362 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
lax enforcement of existing norms that state practice tolerated." 9 For example,
states could usually discharge their obligations by enacting the pertinent legisla-
tion, without regard to the level of protection actually provided, so long as they
respected national treatment. 120 Nor would a state whose judicial or administrative
apparatus failed to repress traffic in goods bearing counterfeit marks necessarily
violate the Convention, notwithstanding formal commitments to the contrary in
articles 9(1) and lOter.121
The TRIPS Agreement breaks with this tradition. It augments the minimum
standards of protection for trademarks generally and initiates action to establish
tough standards for geographic indications of origin. Above all, this Agreement
appears to mandate strict enforcement of both old and new substantive norms,
and it establishes the necessary legal machinery for this purpose.
1. Trademarks
Besides requiring all WTO member countries to comply with the relevant
international minimum standards already set out in the Paris Convention,'22 the
TRIPS Agreement establishes a universally valid legal definition of a trade-
mark.'23 It then invests owners of registered marks with the exclusive right to
prevent third parties from using similar marks for goods or services when such
use would produce a "likelihood of confusion. -124 The trademark owner's exclu-
sive right must last at least seven years after initial registration or after each
renewal of registration, and the principle of indefinitely renewable registrations
is established for trademarks, but not apparently for service marks.' 25
While states may continue to condition registration-but not the filing of an
application for registration-on actual use of a given trademark, 126 cancellation
requires "an uninterrupted period of at least three years of non-use," and govern-
ment actions that hinder such use will not constitute legally valid excuses.12'
Member states can no longer require foreign trademark owners to couple their
119. See, e.g., Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 2, at 770-75 (citing authorities).
120. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(1); Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 31, at 268,
278; Piatti, supra note 118, at 242-43.
121. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 9(6) (postponing sine die the obligation to
enact laws permitting seizure of counterfeit goods); BODENHAUSEN, supra note 44, at 136, 139;
see also 2 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 1284 (1975).
122. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 2(1); supra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
123. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 15(1).
124. See id. art. 16(1). For the view that strengthened international protection of trademarks
should benefit even the developing countries over time, see Reichman, TRIPS and Developing Coun-
tries, supra note 3, at 18-20.
125. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 18; see also Cordray, supra note 12, at 127-28.
126. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 15(3); cf. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
States must afford petitioners a reasonable opportunity to cancel registration, but opposition proceed-
ings are not mandated. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 15(5).
127. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 19(1).
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marks with the indigenous marks of local firms. '28 Nor can they impose compul-
sory licenses or deny the principle of free assignability of marks with, or without,
the business to which they pertain. 1'2 9
Finally, the protection of well-known marks under article 6bis of the Paris
Convention 130 has been strengthened in at least two ways. First, that article now
applies expressly to services.' 3 ' Second, the same provision extends even to
dissimilar goods or services when use of a registered mark would likely indicate
a harmful connection between those dissimilar goods or services and the owner
of the registered mark. 3 1 Whether U.S. compliance with this provision will
require the enactment of a federal dilution statute remains to be seen.' 33 In any
event, owners of well-known marks will benefit more from the anticounterfeiting
measures discussed below than from this back-handed foray into the still contro-
versial theory of dilution.
2. Geographical Indications of Source
Geographical indications identify a good as originating in a particular region,
locality, or territory "where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic
of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. ''14 Article 22
of the TRIPS Agreement appears to institute relatively strong protection against
misleading and certain unfair uses of such indications, and article 23 appears to
confer even stronger protection for geographical indications pertaining to wines
and spirits, 131 which are exempted from the likelihood of confusion test. 136 How-
ever, three grandfather clauses retard the attainment of these goals. '1 One such
clause exempts those who have already used geographical indications of wines
128. Id. art. 20.
129. Id. art. 21.
130. See Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 6bis.
131. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 16(2).
132. See id. art. 16(3).
133. The dilution doctrine protects strong marks against a material reduction in value through
use by third parties even where there is no competition between them or even a likelihood of confusion
between the marks. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24.13 (3d ed. 1992); Jerome Gilson, A Federal Dilution Statute: Is It Time?, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 107 (1993). About half the states in the United States have adopted dilution statutes,
while courts in the remaining states can reach similar results by a variety of doctrines. See generally
Gilson, supra.
134. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 22(1).
135. See id. arts. 22-23. The TRIPS Agreement thus incorporates principles set out in the Lisbon
Arrangement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International Registration, adopted
on October 31, 1958, and revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967 [hereinafter Lisbon Agreement],
reprinted in 3 LADAS, supra note 121, at 1954-57, which had attracted only sixteen signatories. See,
e.g., 2 LADAS, supra note 121, at 1602-11; Cordray, supra note 12, at 128.
136. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 23(1); cf. Lisbon Arrangement, supra note 135,
art. 3.
137. "The grandfather rights are most likely a compromise between the French wineries, ...
and the U.S. wineries who are also using French geographic indications, such as burgundy, to identify
their wines." Cordray, supra note 12, at 128-29.
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and spirits for at least ten years. 3 A second and broader grandfather clause
exempts acquired rights pertaining to trademarks already "applied for or regis-
tered in good faith" or to marks "acquired through use in good faith."- 139 A
third clause exempts geographical indications that have become generic or cus-
tomary terms in the territories of member states. 140
The stage has, therefore, been set for mandatory future negotiations "aimed
at increasing the protection of individual geographical indications." 14' Given the
economic logic of trade negotiations, further progress in this area will probably
require offsetting forms of trade compensation for the adversely affected states.
3. Anticounterfeiting Measures
The TRIPS Agreement requires members to provide detailed enforcement pro-
cedures, 142 and these procedures must afford rights holders the possibility of
obtaining injunctions and provisional measures to prevent infringements. 14' The
Agreement also fulfills an earlier goal of the Paris Convention by instituting
"Special Requirements Related to Border Control Measures. ' ' '" These provi-
sions enable rights holders to take legal action to require the domestic customs
authorities to suspend the release of imported goods into free circulation whenever
the complainants have valid grounds for suspecting that the items in question
are "counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods.""' For this purpose,
"counterfeit trademark goods" are defined as goods or packaging that bear unau-
thorized trademarks identical or similar to registered marks for such goods; and
"pirated copyright goods" are defined as "unauthorized direct copies of protected
Articles the making of which would have infringed either copyright law or related
rights laws in the country of importation." 4 6 The seizure provisions would thus
apply to sound recordings protected only under a neighboring rights law 14' as
well as to more traditional literary and artistic works.
The imposition of border controls to repress imports of counterfeit goods
represents one of the most overdue and promising results of the TRIPS exercise,
provided that states implement these measures in a genuinely nondiscriminatory
138. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 24(4).
139. See id. art. 24(5).
140. See id. art. 24(6).
141. See id. art. 24(1); see also id. art. 24(2) (mandatory review by council for TRIPS within
two years from the time that the WTO Agreement enters into force).
142. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 41(1), 42-50; see infra text accompanying notes
310-11.
143. Id. arts. 44, 50; see also Cordray, supra note 12, at 135-37 (stressing importance of enforce-
ment provisions, including border controls and both civil and criminal penalties).
144. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Title to Part III, Sec. 4; id. arts. 51-60; see also Paris
Convention, supra note 8, arts. 9, 10, lOter, lObis; supra note 121 and accompanying text.
145. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 51.
146. Id. art. 51 n.14.
147. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 153-57, 177-80.
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fashion and do not erect disguised barriers to trade. 148 However, such measures
will succeed only so long as the participating states enforce them vigilantly, and
no weak links appear in the chain. To this end, both developed and developing
countries will have to curb powerful vested interests.
C. COPYRIGHTS AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS
Unlike the Paris Convention with its rudimentary framework of transnational
protection for patentable inventions, the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, as revised in 1971, "9 provides relatively high and
uniform standards of protection for authors and artists in more than eighty coun-
tries. 5 ° The Berne Convention also contains an appendix of preferential measures,
adopted in 1971, which enable nationals of developing countries to secure nonex-
clusive compulsory licenses on favorable terms."5 ' These licenses facilitate local
efforts to translate or otherwise reproduce foreign literary, scientific, and artistic
works that are needed for teaching, scholarship, or research purposes. At the same
time, the appendix forbids exports of works published under these compulsory
licenses, and it recognizes a graduation principle applicable to states that attain
higher levels of development. 1
52
Against this background, progress in international copyright protection under
the TRIPS Agreement depended initially on the adherence of the United States
to preexisting minimum standards. This occurred in 1989, when this country
joined the Berne Union. 53 However, the United States did not adhere to the
Rome Convention of 1961,15 which extended an experimentally protective mantle
to certain related or "neighboring" productions not covered by the Berne Conven-
tion, including sound recordings, run-of-the-mill radio and television broadcasts,
and performing artists' renditions of otherwise copyrightable works. '55 Although a
148. See, e.g., Robert W. Kastenmeier & David W. Beier, International Trade and Intellectual
Property: Promise, Risks and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 297-98 (1989); Reichman,
GATT Connection, supra note 2, at 829-39 (discussing Anti-Counterfeiting Code first proposed, but
not adopted, towards the end of the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations).
149. See Berne Convention, supra note 8.
150. See generally S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 81-125 (1987); Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright:
An Introduction §§ 1-6 [hereinafter Geller, Introduction], in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE §§ 1-6 (Paul Edward Geller ed., 1994).
151. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 21, app. arts. I-VI; RICKETSON, supra note 150,
at 632-64.
152. See Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 2, at 823-26.
153. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
154. See Rome Convention, supra note 15.
155. See, e.g. , WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE ROME CONVEN-
TION AND TO THE PHONOGRAMS CONVENTION 7-13 (1981) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE ROME CONVEN-
TION); see also Geller, Introduction, supra note 150, § 3[c]; Stephen M. Stewart & Hamish Hamilton,
Neighboring Rights, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 185, 188-91, 194-
220 (S.M. Stewart & H. Sandison eds., 1989).
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growing number of states now protect some of these productions in their copyright
laws, 116 international protection of so-called neighboring rights often leaves for-
eign rights holders to the vagaries of domestic laws and at the mercy of residual
conditions of material reciprocity. 57 Other borderline subject matters of recent
vintage, especially computer programs and electronic information tools, have
further strained international intellectual property relations.
5 1
The TRIPS Agreement incorporates most (but not all) of the minimum standards
set out in the Berne Convention, and it begins the task of harmonizing the protec-
tion of neighboring rights. It also addresses some of the problems that computer
programs and electronic information tools have raised, but the make-weight solu-
tions adopted in this context will prove less than satisfactory in the end.
1. Traditional Literary and Artistic Works
The TRIPS Agreement applies minimum standards contained in the Berne Con-
vention to all WTO member countries, whether or not members of the Berne Union,
except that moral rights under article 6bis are excluded. 59 The Agreement also
provides rental rights to owners of copyrighted cinematographic works, at least in
principle, and, in a roundabout way, to the producers of sound recordings, which
are otherwise treated as related or neighboring rights.' 6' These rental rights are
not absolute, however. For example, a member state can exempt cinematographic
works from this obligation by showing that commercial rental activity has not led
to widespread copying that is "materially impairing the exclusive right of reproduc-
tion . . . conferred on authors,"' 62 an exception that presumably applies to the
Although not a signatory to the Rome Convention, supra note 15, the United States did adhere to
other treaties seeking some of the same objectives. See, e.g., The Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, done at Geneva,
Oct. 29, 1971 (Geneva Phonograms Convention), 866 U.N.T.S. 67,25 U.S.T. 309; Convention Relat-
ing to the Distribution of Programmer Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, done at Brussels, May
21, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 1444, T.I.A.S. No. 11,078 (The Brussels Satellite Convention of 1974).
156. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definitions of audiovisual works, motion pictures, and sound
recordings), 102(a)(6) (eligibility of motion pictures and other audiovisual works), 102(a)(7), 114
(sound recordings) (1988); see also Stewart & Hamilton, supra note 155, at 196-97.
157. See, e.g., Rome Convention, supra note 15, art. 16; GUIDE TO THE ROME CONVENTION,
supra note 155, at 60-61.
158. See, e.g., Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2480-88, 2490-98; see also J.H.
Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 24
l.I.C. 446 (1993) [hereinafter Reichman, Electronic Information Tools].
159. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 9(1).
160. See id. art. 11, which mandates rental rights for both cinematographic works and computer
programs. For copyright protection of the latter, see infra text accompanying notes 191-210.
161. Although sound recordings are not mentioned in art. 11, which deals with rental rights, art.
14(4), which deals with the neighboring rights generally, states that the "provisions of Article 11
in respect of computer programs shall apply mutatis mutandis to producers of phonograms and any
other rights holders in phonograms as determined in a Member's law." Since art. 14(2) mandates
the right of producers to "authorize or prohibit . . . reproduction of their phonograms," these
producers' corresponding rental rights seem assured. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 11,
14(2), (4).
162. Id. art. 11.
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United States. 163 Similarly, states that already subject the rental of sound recordings
to a system of equitable remuneration may continue this practice, so long as it does
not entail "material impairment of the exclusive right of reproduction of right hold-
ers," 164 but other states are not obliged to follow suit. Current U.S. copyright law,
which covers both cinematographic works and sound recordings, appears consis-
tent with these provisions, although the introduction of the "material impairment"
concept, drawn from trade law, could raise new questions later on. 161
The TRIPS Agreement requires minimum terms of protection for certain catego-
ries of works, 66 with which U.S. copyright law is generally consistent. 167 It also
mandates retroactive respect for existing literary and artistic works falling within
article 18 of the Berne Convention 168 and for existing sound recordings that are
bootstrapped into the same article of that Convention. 16 9Arguably, these provisions
do conflict with the approach that Congress took in 1989, when the United States
joined the Berne Convention. 7 0 In response, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
of 1994 largely restores the rights of foreign (but not national) copyright owners,
including producers of sound recordings, whose copyrights were technically for-
feited under specified conditions of prior law. 7' This Act also recognizes limited
reliance rights of third parties who acted in the belief that the works in question
had irrevocably entered the public domain. 172 These provisions fulfill-and some
would say overfulfill' 3-the relevant mandate of the TRIPS Agreement.
163. See, e.g., David Nimmer, Copyright's Trade Status: GATTandNAFTA [hereinafter Nimmer,
GA TTandNAFTA] in MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 22 (1994) [hereinafter
M. & D. NIMMER] (arguing that commercial rentals, as distinct from free television and cable
telecasts, could hardly be singled out as the cause of "material impairment" as matters stand).
164. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14(4).
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1988); supra note 163.
166. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 12 (requiring minimum term of 50 years when
protection is not calculated on the basis of an author's natural life, except in the case of photographic
works and works of applied art).
167. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(c), 303-304 (1988).
168. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 70(2), (3).
169. Id. art. 14(6).
170. See Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 153, § 12; M. & D. NIMMER, supra
note 163, § 9A.02, .0211] (forthcoming 1995); see also Katherine S. Deters, Retroactivity and
Reliance Rights under Article 18 of the Berne Copyright Convention, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
971, 988-97 (1991).
171. See URAA, supra note 4, § 514, amending 17 U.S.C. § 104(A) (1988); M. & D. NIMMER,
supra note 163, ch. 9A ("Copyrights Restored from the Public Domain") (forthcoming 1995); PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.5.4.3 (2d ed. forthcoming 1995). In
effect, restoration can flow from the loss of copyright protection due to noncompliance with formali-
ties, including failure of renewal, lack of proper notice, or failure to comply with any manufacturing
requirements; to a lack of national eligibility; and to the lack of subject-matter eligibility with respect
to sound recordings fixed before Feb. 15, 1972. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A; M. & D. NIMMER, supra
note 163, § 9A.04[A], [B]; see also Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(2) ("The enjoyment
and exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality").
172. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 18(3); 17 U.S.C. § 104A; M. & D. NIMMER,
supra note 163, § 9.04[c].
173. See, e.g., M. & D. NIMMER, supra note 163, § 9A.01 (statute confers "greater benefits
on foreigners than Berne ... requires").
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Finally, that Agreement indirectly addresses the scope of copyright protection
by echoing article 9(2) of the Berne Convention. '74 It thus authorizes limitations
on and exceptions to the specified exclusive rights for "certain special cases
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work" and which do not
"unreasonably prejudice" the rights holders' interests. 175 This double-barreled
filter, though subject to state practice, is potentially more restrictive than the
broad fair-use doctrine fashionable in the United States. 176 Whether the elevation
of the Berne criteria to a TRIPS standard will constrain domestic courts or merely
allow their antiprotectionist bias to infiltrate foreign law remains to be seen.
2. Neighboring Rights
In a bold move, the TRIPS Agreement recognizes some minimum standards
of protection for phonogram producers, broadcast organizations, and performing
artists, as derived from the Rome Convention, and it makes these rights univer-
sally applicable while, perhaps, discouraging further development of this Conven-
tion. "' For example, producers of sound recordings must now obtain exclusive
reproduction rights in their recordings, in keeping with article 10 of the Rome
Convention,178 and broadcasting organizations may prohibit unauthorized fixa-
tion, reproduction, retransmission, and communication to the public of their
broadcasts. 179 However, the TRIPS Agreement does not provide producers of
sound recordings with an exclusive right to publicly perform or broadcast their
recordings, nor does it mandate even a right to equitable compensation for second-
ary uses of commercial recordings, which the Rome Convention tries to estab-
lish. 180
174. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 9(2); see also CLAUDE MASOUYE, GUIDE TO THE
BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT 1971)
55-57 (W.I.P.O. ed., 1978); RICKETSON, supra note 150, at 479-89.
175. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 13.
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 1993) (subjecting unpub-
lished works to statutory fair use exception); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164
(1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984);,see also Kerever,
supra note 28, at 635.
177. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14; cf. Rome Convention, supra note 15, arts. 2
(defining national treatment), 7 (minimum protection for performers), 10 (reproduction right for
producers of phonograms), 13 (minimum rights for broadcasting organizations); see also David
Vaver, Tripping Through TRIPS: Canada and Copyright, 22 CANADIAN L. NEWSL. 53, 55-58 (1994);
Kerever, supra note 28, at 635-36 (complaining that TRIPS marginalizes the Rome Convention).
178. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14(2); cf. Rome Convention, supra note 15, art.
10; GUIDETOTHE ROME CONVENTION, supra note 155, at 43 (noting absence of exclusive importation
or distribution rights under this provision).
179. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14(3) (stating condition that the relevant domestic
laws also grant these rights); cf. Rome Convention, supra note 15, art. 13 (which is broader in
certain respects than the TRIPS standard).
180. See Rome Convention, supra note 15, art. 12; GUIDE TO THE ROME CONVENTION, supra
note 155, at 46 (Rome Convention "does not offer, as an alternative to [equitable] remuneration,
the grant of an exclusive right" to so-called secondary uses of sound recordings); cf. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106(4), 114(2) (1988). Moreover, the Rome Convention allows states broad latitude in determining
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These neighboring rights provisions presented no serious difficulties for the
United States, whose copyright law already treats both sound recordings and
broadcasts as "works of authorship" if they are original and fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. 8' For this same reason, domestic law was also consistent
with article 14(5) of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires that the rights con-
ferred on phonogram producers and broadcasting organizations last at least fifty
and twenty years, respectively.' 82
In contrast, article 14(1) of the TRIPS Agreement obliges member states to
allow performing artists the "legal possibility" of preventing the unauthorized
fixation of their unfixed performances on a sound recording and the reproduction
of such fixations, and also the legal possibility of preventing broadcasting organi-
zations from transmitting their live, unrecorded performances without permis-
sion. 183 The performers' rights, but not the corresponding broadcasters' rights,
must last for a minimum term of fifty years and not just the twenty-year term
that the Rome Convention guarantees."4
The protection that the TRIPS Agreement thus affords performing artists, which
is more limited (except for duration) than the corresponding provisions of the Rome
Convention on which it is based, 85 does not mandate any exclusive rights at all and
does not deal with authorized fixations as such. 186 Rather, the TRIPS regime applies
its flexible obligations to unauthorized fixations of live performances, as might
occur, for example, with bootleg recordings, and also to unauthorized broadcasts
of live performances."87 Even so, the lack of any uniform federal law regulating
rights in unfixed works of any kind, let alone performers' renditions, raised suffi-
cient doubts about the consistency of U.S. law with these provisions as to elicit a
who receives compensation for direct secondary uses of commercial phonograms, see generally
GUIDE TO THE ROME CONVENTION, supra note 155, at 46-52; and its signatories may opt not to
apply art. 12 at all, or even to apply it on a reciprocal basis, without national treatment, see Rome
Convention, supra note 15, art. 16, an option preserved under TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4,
art. 14(6). Hence, Rome signatories that apply the equitable compensation principle of art. 12 to public
performances of commercial sound recordings still labor under no binding international obligation to
share these royalties with U.S. record producers and performing artists.
181. See supra note 156; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
182. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14(5); supra note 167 and accompanying text.
With respect to phonogram producers, the TRIPS Agreement thus enlarges the twenty-year term
guaranteed by Rome Convention, supra note 15, art. 14.
183. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14(1); cf. Rome Convention, supra note 15, art.
3(a) (defining "performers" to mean "actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who
act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise perform literary or artistic works").
184. Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14(3), (5), with Rome Convention, supra
note 15, art. 14.
185. See Rome Convention, supra note 15, art. 7(1); Vaver, supra note 177, at 55-56.
186. Cf. GUIDE TO THE ROME CONVENTION, supra note 155, at 34-36 (allowing flexible implemen-
tation under unfair competition law, employment law, or personality rights).
187. See, e.g., Vaver, supra note 177, at 56, 58 n.21 (noting that performers' authorized, fixed
performances are left to contractual negotiations with producers); Nimmer, GAiT & NAFTA, supra
note 163, at 24.
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broad but poorly drafted antibootlegging statute for live musical performances in
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994.188
The neighboring rights provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are, to some extent,
encumbered by the ability of member states to invoke the "conditions, limitations,
exceptions and reservations" recognized by the Rome Convention. 189 Among
other things, this opens the door to demands for reciprocity, rather than national
treatment, with respect to payments of equitable compensation for public perfor-
mances of sound recordings in countries that adopt such a system.'9
3. Computer Programs and Electronic Information Tools
The TRIPS Agreement adopts a "Berne plus" formula that requires member
states to protect computer programs "whether in source or object code . . . as
literary works under the Berne Convention (1971) "'9' and to protect compilations,
including data bases, to the extent they are "intellectual creations. ' ' These
provisions raise more questions than they answer.
For example, the TRIPS Agreement expressly incorporates the exclusion of
"ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such"
into international copyright law for the first time. 193 Yet, the application of this
principle to computer programs remains extremely controversial,' 94 and its do-
mestic counterpart has led the U.S. federal appellate courts to limit copyright
protection to wholesale duplication of computer programs lest they inadvertently
protect functional components as such.' 9
Even the obligation to treat computer programs "as literary works" remains
inherently ambiguous because, in actual practice, no state or group of states has
simply applied the mature copyright paradigm to computer programs without
188. See URAA, supra note 4, § 512, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1101 ("unauthorized fixation and
trafficking in sound recordings and music videos"). This statute raises more questions than it answers.
See generally M. & D. NIMMER, supra note 163, ch. 8E ("Rights Against Bootlegging Musical
Performances") (forthcoming 1995).
189. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14(6); see also Rome Convention, supra note 15, art.
16.
190. See Rome Convention, supra note 15, arts. 12, 16(1)(a); supra note 180.
191. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 10(1).
192. See id. art. 10(2); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988); Kerever, supra note 28, at 630-31, 633-35,
193. See id. art. 9(2). State practice has universally recognized the idea-expression dichotomy
in one form or another. See, e.g., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 155, at 12.
194. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of
the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311,
324-52; J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copy-
right Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 689-96, 693 n.288
(1989) (interpreting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)).
195. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of computer programs), 102(b) (idea-expression) (1988);
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Computer Assocs.
Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960
F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992); Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture
Computer Servs., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
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tailor-made adjustments of considerable significance.' 96 The TRIPS provision
can thus be read to permit domestic variants on eligibility and scope of protection
like those adopted at various times in the developed countries. 97 This, in turn,
could eventually give rise to a subcategory of "applied literature" parallel to
that of applied art. 198 However, states inclined to move in this direction must
take pains to respect the fifty-year minimum term and the rental rights that the
TRIPS Agreement guarantees.199
The most valuable aspect of a computer program resides in the dynamic behav-
ioral impact it achieves by means of a functionally determined combination of
subprograms. 2'00 Yet, copyright laws cannot protect functionally determined com-
binations of data structures or functional components of user interfaces without
granting patent-like protection,° 1 nor do copyright laws protect the technical know-
how and industrial design responsible for program behavior.2 2 For these reasons,
the U.S. federal appellate courts have recently applied a successive filtering test
that, in effect, gives only "thin" protection to external expressive features, espe-
cially the code, in both applications programs and operating systems programs.2 3
These decisions decline to treat a second comer's attainment of functional equiva-
lence as infringement merely because of nonliteral similarities in "structure, se-
quence and organization," without proof that nonfunctional expressive features
were copied rather than independently created.2°4 Still other U.S. copyright deci-
sions reinforce trade secret law by permitting second comers to decompile an origi-
196. See, e.g., Thomas Vinje, The Legislative History of the EC Software Directive, in A HAND-
BOOK OF EUROPEAN SOFTWARE LAW 39, 78-81 (M. Lehmann & C.F. Tapper eds., 1993) (stressing
"special rules accommodating the unique nature of computer programs"); for U.S. practice, see
infra text accompanying notes 203-05.
197. See, e.g., Michael Lehmann, The European Directive on the Protection of Computer Pro-
grams, in A HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN SOFTWARE LAW, supra note 193, at 163, 166 n.2, 167 n.3
and accompanying text (discussing high eligibility requirements in early German decisions); Reich-
man, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2480-83 (case of France); Vinje, supra note 193, at 79-81
(case of European Union); see also Mitsuo Matsushita, A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 81, 94 (extent of software protection under
TRIPS Agreement art. 10 "unsettled").
198. Cf. Berne Convention, supra note 8, arts. 2(1), (7), 7(4); J.H. Reichman, Design Protection
in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of
1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1153-67; see further Reichman, Know-How Gap in TRIPS, supra note
10, pt. I.B. But see Kerever, supra note 28, at 634-35.
199. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 11 (rental rights), 12 (fifty-year minimum term
except for photographic works and applied art); URAA, supra note 4, § 511, amending 17 U.S.C.
§ 109 (rental rights in computer programs).
200. See generally Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 99, at 2316-30.
201. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); supra note 194.
202. See Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 99, at 2347-61.
203. See supra note 195.
204. See most recently Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 1995 WL 94669 (1st Cir. 1995);
see also Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 99, at 2349-56; Reichman, Know-How Gap in
TRIPS, supra note 10, pt. I.B. But see Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986) (broad copyright protection for elements of structure, sequence and organization),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
SUMMER 1995
372 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
nator's object code for purposes of reverse-engineering noncopyrightable ideas or
components that second comers cannot reasonably discover by other means, so
long as they independently create their own end products without embodying the
originators' protectable expression.205 These solutions appear more or less consis-
tent with foreign law 2°6 and the Berne Convention.
20 7
In short, the TRIPS solution can effectively impede wholesale duplication of
computer software, and especially code, much like unfair competition law did in
some European countries prior to the European Union's Directive on Computer
programs.0 8 But neither copyright laws nor trade secret laws as reinforced by the
TRIPS Agreement2°9 prevent reimplementation of functionally equivalent behav-
ior. Nor do these laws impede second comers in developed or developing countries
from using components that are functionally determined or that constitute either
standards of efficiency in the trade or market-determined standards that consumers
require. Moreover, because article 10 of the TRIPS Agreement expressly requires
computer programs to be protected "as literary works," it allows the developing
countries to invoke the compulsory license provisions set out in the appendix to the
Berne Convention for certain educational and research purposes zt°
The decision to entrust the protection of computer programs to copyright law as
literary works, with no corresponding prohibition against the copying of unpro-
tectable functional components, may thus boomerang against its proponents at the
international level. In effect, it endows competitors everywhere who are willing to
master lawful techniques of reverse-engineering with promising prospects, indeed.
Attempts to deal with databases by requiring WTO member states to protect
compilations whose selection and arrangements amount to original intellectual
creations"' will prove equally futile, for the reason that many, if not most,
electronic data bases are so functionally organized that they could fail to meet
this standard.2"' Even when a database satisfies the eligibility requirements, the
United States Supreme Court holds that third parties may extract the compiler's
205. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839-41 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Brief Amicus Curiae of Eleven
Copyright Law Professors in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 33 JURIMETRICS.J. 147 (1992).
206. See Council of the European Communities, Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the legal
protection of computer programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 91/250/EEC, arts. 4-6. See generally Vinje,
supra note 196, at 79-81 (stressing uncertainties of interpretation that are left to local law, especially
with regard to decompilation).
207. See, e.g., William Cornish, Computer Program Copyright and the Berne Convention, 4
E.I.P.R. 129 (1990) (reverse analysis consistent with Berne Convention so long as fruits of analysis
are not used to reproduce substantially the expression of the analyzed program).
208. See supra note 206.
209. See infra text accompanying notes 250-62 (international protection of undisclosed informa-
tion).
210. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
211. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 10(2); supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
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disparate data without normally infringing a copyright based on selection and
213arrangement. For these and other reasons, the Commission of the European
Communities has proposed a council directive on the legal protection of electronic
databases, which would protect the compiler's data under a sui generis regime
related to copyright law214 that the TRIPS Agreement would appear not to cover. 215
The hard truth these developments confirm is that, as currently constituted,
the world's intellectual property system is simply not equipped to deal with the
real problem of twenty-first century technological development, which is how
to protect "incremental innovation bearing know-how on its face."- 216 This
"know-how gap in TRIPS" thus parallels a similar gap in the domestic intellectual
property laws.217 Until these make-weight solutions are reinforced or displaced
at the domestic and international levels by an integrated liability regime capable
of protecting embodiments of technical know-how that do not qualify for classical
trade secret protection, 2t s the long-term benefits of the TRIPS Agreement will
fall well below present expectations.
III. Ancillary Proprietary Regimes and Trade Regulation
The TRIPS Agreement, unlike the Paris Convention, disregards utility mod-
els,219 and it also ignores newer sui generis regimes that protect unpatented func-
tional designs on modified copyright principles. 220 The Agreement nonetheless
singles out one class of functional designs-integrated circuit designs (also known
as "mask works," "lay-out designs," and "semiconductor chip topogra-
213. See, e.g., id. at 1296. See generally Reichman, TRIPS Component, supra note 2, at 225-29.
214. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on the
Legal Protection of Databases, COM(92)24-SYN 393, at 58-74 (1992); Commission of the European
Communities, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases,
COM(93)464-SYN 393 (1993). See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2493-98
(analyzing and criticizing these proposals).
215. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
216. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2506-19; see also Samuelson et al., Manifesto,
supra note 99, at 2333-41.
217. See supra notes 193-94, 200-05 and accompanying text; see generally Reichman, Know-How
Gap in TRIPS, supra note 10, pt. II.
218. For the theory that such a regime should follow modified liability principles loosely derived
from trade secret law, and not the exclusive rights model of modified patent and copyright regimes,
see generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2519-44 (discussing "A Default Liability
Regime for Applied Know-How").
219. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 8, arts. 1(2), 4(A)(1), 5(A)(5) (applying national
treatment, priority rights, and limitations on the scope of protection to utility models); see also
Michael Kem, Towards a European Utility Model Law, 25 I.I.C. 627-48 (1994); Max Planck Institute
for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Proposal of the Max Planck
Institutefora European Utility Model Law, 25 I.I.C. 700 (1994). For an explanation of utility models
in relation to computer programs, see also Reichman, Electronic Information Tools, supra note 158,
at 451-55.
220. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, §§ 213-264 (Eng.); Christine Fellner,
The New United Kingdom Industrial Design Law, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 369 (1989/90).
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phies")-for detailed regulation.2 It also protects confidential information at
the international level for the first time, and it begins the arduous task of reconcil-
ing the domestic competition laws insofar as they bear on enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights.
A. INTEGRATED CIRCUIT DESIGNS
In effect, the TRIPS Agreement mandates compliance with core substantive
provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits
of 1989 (IPIC Treaty),2 2 which, not surprisingly, embody the spirit if not always
the practice of the U.S. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA).223
Among other provisions, the TRIPS Agreement obliges WTO members to pro-
hibit unauthorized imports, sales or commercial distribution of a protected layout
design, of an integrated circuit embodying such a design, or of an article incorpo-
rating an integrated circuit, for at least ten years, subject to a good faith excep-
tion.224 These provisions, once implemented within the TRIPS framework, should
moot the unilateral reciprocity requirement in the SCPA,2 5 which arguably vio-
lated the Paris Convention and certainly introduced a dangerous precedent into
international intellectual property law.226
Because the IPIC Treaty, as put forward in 1989, afforded fairly broad opportu-
nities to invoke compulsory licenses, 27 most developed countries refused to sign
it in the end. Fearing that the developing countries or former socialist countries
might use such licenses to overcome currently high barriers to entry,22 8 the semi-
conductor industries persuaded the drafters to override these provisions in the
TRIPS Agreement. Article 35 thus excludes the compulsory license provisions
of the IPIC Treaty from the list of mandatory international minimum standards,
while article 37(2) refers states contemplating the imposition of compulsory li-
221. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Part I, Section 6 ("Layout-designs (topographies) of
Integrated Circuits"), arts. 35-38.
222. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 35 (mandating compliance with arts. 2-7 (except
for art. 6(3)), 12, 16(3) of IPIC Treaty, supra note 15).
223. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA), Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335,
3347 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The exclusive
reproduction right this law grants is coupled with an absolute right to reverse-engineer protected
designs for analytical purposes. See, e.g., Leo J. Raskind, Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition,
and Fair Use, 70 MINN. L. REV. 385, 402 (1985); J.H. Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights
in University-Generated Research Products: The Case of Computer Programs, 17 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 51, 110-16 (1992) [hereinafter Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights].
224. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 36-38.
225. See SCPA, supra note 223, §§ 902(a)(I)(A)-(C), 913, 914 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
226. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
227. See IPIC Treaty, supra note 15, art. 6(3) ("Measures Concerning Use Without the Consent
of the Holder of the Right").
228. On the formidable barriers to entry that favor semiconductor chip industries in developed
countries, see, e.g., John G. Rauch, The Realities of Our Times: The Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984 and the Evolution of the Semiconductor Industry, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SocY
93, 121 (1993); Correa, supra note 76, at 84-86.
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censes to article 3 1, which regulates these licenses in regard to patentable inven-
tions in general.229 As noted, however, a last-minute amendment to article 31(c)
denied private or public commercial use of compulsory licenses "in the case of
semiconductor technology," even though compulsory licenses remain available
for "public non-commercial use" of such technology and for public or private
uses that remedy judicially determined anticompetitive practices. 30
It is unclear from this language whether article 3 1 (c) applies only to patented
semiconductor technologies, as at least one commentator believes,23" ' or also to
unpatented semiconductor chip designs covered by articles 35-38, as the drafters
probably intended. If the exemption for "semiconductor chip technologies" in-
serted into article 3 1 (c) is read broadly to include even unpatented semiconductor
chip designs, then it would make "semiconductor technology" into a sacred cow,
which member states could not normally subject to commercial, nonexclusive
compulsory licenses under the rules applicable to other forms of industrial prop-
erty.
B. INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS
Given the continued lack of international consensus concerning the proper
means of protecting industrial designs,2 32 the TRIPS Agreement leaves participat-
ing states relatively free to draft domestic design protection laws with local objec-
tives in mind. Although members must provide some form of design protection
to satisfy both the TRIPS provisions and article 5quinquies of the Paris Conven-
tion, on which the TRIPS Agreement builds,233 states may resort either to an
industrial property law or to copyright law for these purposes, and they need
not protect functionally determined designs at all. 2 34 Members must protect textile
designs, however, either in a design law or in copyright law, 235 and their sui
generis laws must protect appearance designs against copying for at least a ten-
year period.236
229. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 31, 35, 37(2); supra text accompanying notes
62-76.
230. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 31(c); supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
231. See Nimmer, GA7T & NAFTA, supra note 163, at 27; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 4, art. 31 ("where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent
without the authorization of the right holder" (emphasis supplied)).
232. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States
Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6, 8-10, 123-35 (1989/90) [herein-
after Reichman, Designs and New Technologies]; Ralph S. Brown, Copyright-Like Protection for
Designs, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 308 (1989/90).
233. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 25-26; Paris Convention, supra note 8, art.
5quinquies.
234. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 25(1), (2).
235. See id. art. 25(2).
236. See id. art. 26(1), (3).
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Current U.S. law appears to accommodate all of these requirements.237 How-
ever, article 25(1) of the TRIPS Agreement obliges members to "provide for the
protection of independently created industrial designs that are new or original,"
238
whereas U.S. design patent law requires candidate designs to meet both a novelty
and a true nonobviousness standard.2 39 The TRIPS drafters clearly intended "orig-
inality" to entail more of a creative contribution than mere independent creation
because they used the two terms to convey different meanings in the same provi-
sion.240 Yet, given the drafters' emphasis on the criterion of "nonobviousness"
in the patent provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and on "originality" in its
design protection provisions,24' the latter criterion appears to conflict with the
eligibility requirements of the U.S. design patent law.
Article 25 thus appears to represent a backhanded attempt to oblige Congress
to align the legal protection of industrial designs in this country with more protec-
tionist trends abroad, despite the failure of sectoral lobbyists to achieve a similar
242result in recent years. In this connection, current efforts to harmonize the design
laws of the European Union2 43 could influence the direction of reform in the
237. For the exclusion of functionally dictated designs from the design patent law, which protects
ornamental designs of useful articles, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1988); Reichman, Designs andNew
Technologies, supra note 232, at 37-42, 47-53. Unpatentable fabric designs (but not three-dimensional
dress designs) obtain copyright protection as pictorial works. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113(b)
(1988) (definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works and limits of protection); Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 232, at 59-61.
Most three-dimensional designs of useful articles are neither patentable nor copyrightable under
current U.S. law because they fail to meet the novelty and nonobviousness criteria of patent law
and contain no aesthetic features that can exist separately from, and independently of, their utilitarian
aspects. See supra note 232; Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 232, at 20-36,
45-81 (citing authorities). However, three-dimensional product designs are frequently protected for
an unlimited time as unregistered "appearance trade dress" under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
which operates as a de facto federal law of unfair competition. See id. at 81-123; see also Ralph
S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1987); J.H. Reichman, Past
and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design Protection Law-A Comment, 4 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 387, 392 (1993) [hereinafter Reichman, Evolution of Design Law].
238. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 25(1).
239. See U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 171 (1988); supra note 237.
240. See supra text accompanying note 238 (quoting TRIPS Agreement art. 25(1)). "Originality"
in foreign design law often signifies more than independent creation and less than nonobviousness,
although until recently the two terms were more or less synonymous under the United Kingdom's
registered design law of 1949, which resembled the U.S. design patent law. See, e.g., Reichman,
Designs and New Technologies, supra note 232, at 20-30 (comparing criteria of eligibility in foreign
design laws with those of United States), 34-51 (evolution of eligibility standards in domestic design
patent law), 148-51 (evolution of design protection laws in the United Kingdom); see also Fellner,
supra note 220, at 372-75, 388-89.
241. Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27(1), with id. art. 25(1).
242. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 232; James F. Fitzpatrick, Industrial Design Protection and
Competition in Automobile Replacement Parts-Back to Monopoly Profits?, 19 U. BALT. L. REV.
233 (1989/90); J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the Legislative Agenda, 55 LAW& CONTEMP.
PROBS. 281, 290-96 (1992).
243. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Regulation on the Community Design, COM(93)-COD 463, Dec. 3, 1993 [hereinafter
Proposed EU Directive on Designs].
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United States if it became necessary to enact a sui generis regime by dint of
article 25. Moreover, recent proposals for a European Union Directive concerning
utility models, 2 " if acted upon, could logically reinforce trends favoring the
protection of functional designs that fail to meet the nonobviousness standard of
patent law, 245 despite the anticompetitive effects of such regimes. 246
Meanwhile, exporters in both developed and developing countries should note
that compliance with the requirements of domestic design laws provides no guar-
antees against infringements of foreign design rights based on different criteria.
For example, designs legally created or copied under current U.S. law, if ex-
ported, could sometimes violate the United Kingdom's unregistered design right,
which protects both functional and appearance designs, 247 as well as, say, the
French copyright law, or the new Japanese unfair competition law.248 Conversely,
designs legally created abroad could, if imported into the United States, sometimes
violate section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, under which the federal appellate courts
routinely protect unregistered three-dimensional product configurations as "ap-
pearance trade dress.' 249
C. TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
The TRIPS Agreement is the first international convention expressly to require
member countries to protect undisclosed information. 2 0 A systematic failure to
provide either trade secret protection or equivalent laws governing confidential
disclosures should thus become actionable as a distinct component of the interna-
tional regime of unfair competition law that article lObis of the Paris Convention
244. See supra note 219.
245. The United Kingdom's unregistered design right, enacted in 1988, supra note 220, protects
both functional and appearance designs on a modified copyright approach; for a time, it seemed
likely that the European Union would adopt a similar approach. See, e.g., Hugh Griffiths, Overview
of Developments in Europe on Industrial Design Protection, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 359 (1993). More recently, the decision to press for a European Union Directive on utility
models, see supra note 219, which would directly protect unpatented functional designs and other small
inventions, has alleviated pressures to protect functional designs under the Proposed EU Directive on
Designs, supra note 243. See id. arts. 4(1), 6(1), 9; Bernard Posner, The Proposal for an EU Design,
unpublished paper presented to the International Conference on Industrial Design Protection, Tokyo
and Kyoto, Japan, Nov. 8-10, 1984 (denying that highly functional designs are to be protected as
such, but illustrating text of the proposed Directive with pictures of highly functional designs). These
trends will probably revive interest in recent proposals to align U.S. law with the United Kingdom's
unregistered design right. See Reichman, Evolution of Design Law, supra note 237, at 397-400.
246. See, e.g., Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2459-65, 2503-04; see also Reichman,
Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights and Trade, supra note 3, at 97-98.
247. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
248. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2459-65, 2475-76.
249. See generally Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 232, at 8-10, 81-123,
126-35; supra note 237.
250. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Part I, Section 7 ("Protection of Undisclosed Informa-
tion"); id. art. 39(1) (incorporating by reference Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. l0bis (concern-
ing protection against unfair competition)).
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already covers.25' Violations of article lObis, in turn, become subject to the
enforcement procedures and improved dispute-settlement machinery of the WTO
Agreement as a whole.252
The language that article 39(2) of the TRIPS Agreement uses to mandate the
protection of undisclosed information resembles that of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, which is widely adopted at the local level in the United States. 253 However,
there is no express provision that guarantees third parties the right to reverse-
engineer products made from secret processes by proper means.254 While the
United States Supreme Court has invested this right with constitutional underpin-
nings, 25 article 39(2) merely invokes article 1Obis of the Paris Convention, which
would require third parties not to acquire undisclosed information "in a manner
contrary to honest commercial practices." 256 A footnote to article 39(2) precludes
"at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and induce-
ments to breach, '257 but does not affirmatively endorse reverse-analysis as
such.258
Whether a duly appointed WTO panel would regard a competitor's right to
reverse-engineer by proper means as inherent in the "honest commercial prac-
tices" standard for purposes of dispute-settlement proceedings remains to be
seen. 259 A failure to do so would compromise both the economic functions of
trade secret laws 26° and a long-standing constitutional tradition concerning the
rights and duties of competitors under U.S. trade regulation law.26' It also remains
to be seen whether a federal trade secret law is needed to comply with the United
States' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.
To operate successfully under article 39, entrepreneurs in both developed and
developing countries may legitimately acquire unlicensed technology through
251. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 39(1), (2); BODENHAUSEN, supra note 44, at 142-46.
252. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 310-15.
253. Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 37(2), with Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1,
14 U.L.A. 438 (1985) [hereinafter UTSA]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
LAW §§ 38-45 (1995).
254. See, e.g., UTSA, supra note 253, § 1(2), (4); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION LAW, supra note 253, § 43 & cmt. b.
255. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476, 490 (1974); Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989).
256. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 39(2); Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. lObis(2);
BODENHAUSEN, supra note 44, at 142-46.
257. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 39(2) n. 10.
258. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, supra note 253, cmt. b, at 493
(stating that "others remain free to analyze products publicly marketed by the trade secret owner
and, absent .. .a patent or copyright, to exploit any information acquired through such 'reverse
engineering' ").
259. See infra text accompanying notes 328-29; cf. Geller, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note
5, at 313-15.
260. See, e.g., David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Some Economics of
Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 70 (1991) [hereinafter Friedman et al.]. See generally
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2438-42, 2521-27.
261. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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self-help methods of reverse-engineering even when copycat duplication that
avoids any contribution to the global costs of research and development might
otherwise violate copyright or unfair competition laws. This task, facilitated by
the availability of technical engineering skills in the global labor market, tends
to root the technology in the local culture and to provide a basis for future research
and development as well as export potential. Trade secret protection should thus
benefit innovators everywhere, and it could stimulate the licensing of more ad-
vanced foreign technologies to developing countries by reducing both risk aver-
sion and transaction costs. 262
D. TRADE REGULATION MEASURES
One of the general principles established in article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement
is the right of states to adopt appropriate measures "to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unrea-
sonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technol-
ogy.' ,263 The Agreement also reinforces general principles of unfair competition
law falling within the purview of the Paris Convention.
1. Constraints on Licensing
The general right of states to prevent abuse initially acquires greater specificity
in the rules on the compulsory licensing of patents that were previously dis-
cussed. 264 As regards trademarks, in contrast, states "may determine conditions
on the licensing and assignment of trademarks," but they may no longer impose
compulsory licenses on trademark proprietors.265
Beyond these provisions, article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement reiterates the
legitimacy of controlling anticompetitive practices in contractual licenses affect-
ing intellectual property rights generally.266 However, article 40(1) acknowledges
the lack of consensus in this area267 by conceding that states agree only "that
some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights
262. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Legal Nature and Contractual Conditions in Know-How Trans-
actions, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 449,452-54,468 (1981); Robert M. Sherwood, A Microeconomic
View of Intellectual Property Protection in Brazilian Development, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 116-29 (Francis W. Rushing &
Carole Ganz Brown eds., 1990); see also S.J. Soltysinski, Are Trade Secrets Property?, 17 I.I.C.
331, 346-55 (1986).
263. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 8(2) (emphasis added).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 56-80.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 21.
266. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 40 and title to Part II, Section 8 ("Control of
Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual Licenses").
267. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text; Matsushita, supra note 197, at 92-93; Spencer
Weber Waller & Noel J. Byrne, Changing View of intellectual Property and Competition Law in
the European Community and the United States of America, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993); see
also Reichman, Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights and Trade, supra note 3, at 87-94
("Pressures on the Doctrine of Misuse").
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. . . restrain competition" and "may have adverse effects on trade and may
impede the transfer and dissemination of technology." 26 s Article 40(2) then autho-
rizes single states to legislate against "licensing practices or conditions that may
in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.- 269 Evidently, this provision
attempts to address the kinds of abuse sounding in antitrust principles that devel-
oped countries normally recognize, 270 without necessarily impeding the devel-
oping countries from proceeding on other grounds either under the formulation
of article 8 or under broader principles inherent in the objectives set out in article
7 and in the public interest exception set out in article 8(1).271 Even so, the
negotiators could only agree to name "exclusive grantback conditions, conditions
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing" as examples
of practices that states may clearly legislate against under article 40(2) .272
Given this lack of consensus and its attendant soft-law approach, the logical solu-
tion was to require consultations when conflicts occur.273 In this respect, article
40(3) cuts two ways. It allows developing countries in particular cases to request
information from developed countries that bears on alleged violations of local regu-
lations, which could embarrass the alleged violator before his own government.
274
But it also allows developed countries to demand consultations when they view the
local action or regulations as exceeding the mandate of article 40.275
The likely consequence of these provisions is a further round of talks in which
both sides try to establish a greater consensus regarding actions to restrain misuse
of intellectual property rights.276 Indeed, the express legitimization of a demand
for consultations to deal with questionable regulatory acts appears to mandate
further negotiations along these lines, even if the uncertain applications of antitrust
268. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 40(1).
269. Id. art. 40(2); see also id. art. 8.
270. See supra notes 64, 72-73 and accompanying text.
271. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 7, 8(1); supra text accompanying notes 65-71,
77-80; cf. MICHAEL BLAKENEY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES 131-61 (1989) (discussing United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), Draft International Code on the Transfer of Technology, UNCTAD Doc. TD/CODE/
TOT/47, June 5, 1985).
272. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 40(2). Among topics not mentioned were exclusive
dealing, restrictions on research and adaptation, exclusive sales or representation agreements, tying
arrangements, patent pooling or cross-licensing arrangements, restrictions on publicity, obligations
to pay royalties after the expiration of intellectual property rights, and post-contractual restrictions.
See, e.g., Matsushita, supra note 197, at 92 n.42.
273. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 40(3), (4).
274. Id. art. 40(3).
275. Id. art. 40(3), (4).
276. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for the GA7T-WTO
World Trade and Legal System, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 35 (1993); John H. Jackson, GATT and the
Future of International Trade Institutions, 18 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 11,24 (1992) (stressing that monopo-
lies "can undo the trade liberalization effect of reduced tariffs and nontariff barriers"); see also
Thomas Cottier, The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 383,
410 (1991).
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principles to intellectual property rights in the developed countries themselves
cast doubt on the efficacy of such negotiations."'
2. Unfair Competition
Meanwhile, with specific regard to unfair competition law as distinct from
antitrust in general and misuse in particular, one should emphasize that the TRIPS
Agreement incorporates article lObis of the Paris Convention by reference.278
Article lObis proscribes acts "contrary to honest practices in industrial commer-
cial matters" as established in international trade. 279 A consensus exists regarding
traditional acts of passing off and related activities that tend to deceive or confuse
consumers, which matters are addressed at the federal level in the United States
by Lanham Act section 43(a).28° The outer limits of article lObis remain to be
clarified, 28 1 and some scholars fear that unfair competition law in general is
not yet ripe for harmonization.282 Nevertheless, states that continue to tolerate
practices that blatantly deceive or confuse consumers with regard to foreign
products could find themselves embroiled in the dispute-settlement procedures
established in the Uruguay Round.283
IV. Ongoing Trade Based Initiatives
If one steps back from the details of the TRIPS Agreement, the overall effect
is arguably to vitiate the obsolete historical tradition that required states to respect
only tangible forms of alien property under their jurisdiction while leaving intangi-
ble creations to the whims of territorial law.2u Intellectual creations unquestion-
ably present a formidable "public good" problem owing to their intangibility,
inexhaustibility, and ubiquitous character.285 Yet, now that intangible intellectual
creations have become the most valuable source of wealth for twenty-first century
277. For specific proposals, see Working Group, International Antitrust Code, Draft International
Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement, Munich, Germany, July 10, 1993,
reprinted in 5 WORLD TRADE MATERIALS 126 (1993); see also Reichman, Competition Law, Intellec-
tual Property Rights and Trade, supra note 3, at 110-13 (discussing these proposals).
278. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 2(1) (generally incorporating minimum standards
of Paris Convention, supra note 8, including art. l0bis), 39(1) (specifically applying Paris Convention,
art. l0bis, to undisclosed information).
279. See Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. lObis(2); BODENHAUSEN, supra note 44, at 144.
280. See Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. l0bis(l), (2), (3); Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1988).
281. See generally 3 LADAS, supra note 121, at 1685-91, 1705-06.
282. See, e.g., Gerhard Schricker, European Harmonization of Unfair Competition Law-A Futile
Venture?, 156 I.I.C. 788 (1991).
283. See infra text accompanying notes 313-15; see also Geller, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra
note 5, at 106-12.
284. See generally Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 2, at 796-814 (citing authorities).
285. See, e.g., ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS-ISSUES AND
CONTROVERSIES 15-25 (1987); Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Di-
lemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853 (1992).
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economic development, the preservation of comity between nations requires that
the international community cease to pretend that such creations become any the
less alien property merely because they easily cross national frontiers. 216 This
principle applies with particular force to a rapidly integrating world market whose
operations depend on the reciprocal willingness of states to recognize comparative
advantages under neutral and relatively efficient rules of international trade.287
Modem post-industrial economies are organized around the interplay between
competition and monopoly that intellectual property systems mediate, and the
continued growth of these economies appears tied to the technical and cultural
development such systems seek to foster. 28 This, in turn, renders each national
subsystem increasingly vulnerable to the countervailing policies of other national
systems and to the regulatory dispositions affecting intellectual property rights
in the world market as a whole. 289 The legitimate economic policies pursued by
different groups of states with respect to intellectual property rights are thus
bound to overlap and conflict for the foreseeable future. The resulting tensions
can only be lessened through good faith negotiation and cooperation between
states, in a manner that "takes into account the interests of. . . [the developed]
countries . . . [without] prejudicing the interests of developing countries. -290
A. COMPENSATION AS THE KEY TO FUTURE CONCESSIONS
The process of integrating intellectual property law into international economic
law necessarily imposes short and medium-term social costs on the developing
countries.29 These costs are, to varying degrees, offset by the prospects of en-
hanced market access,292 of technical cooperation to implement the TRIPS
286. To pretend that aliens have no legal claims arising from wholesale, unauthorized uses of
their most valuable property while respecting laws that protect less valuable alien property only
because it is tangible rather than intangible is to exalt form over substance. Sooner or later, both private
and public international law must assimilate intellectual property rights to the general international
minimum standards that preserve comity by dissuading states from authorizing uncompensated uses
of intangible alien property on their national territories. Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note
2, at 810-11.
287. See, e.g., Hartridge & Subramanian, supra note 7, at 895-96.
288. See, e.g., Gadbaw & Richards, Introduction, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS-GLOBAL
CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 1 (R.M. Gadbaw & T. Richards eds., 1988).
289. See, e.g., Kenneth Dam, The Growing Importance of International Protection of Intellectual
Property, 21 INT'L LAW. 627 (1987).
290. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A 9631 (1974); see also Charney, supra note 1, at 529 (stressing
"need to develop universal norms to address global concerns ... that are binding on all subjects
of international law . . . [lest] an exempted, recalcitrant state . .. act as a spoiler for the entire
international community"); Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 2, at 806-07.
291. See, e.g., Primo Braga, supra note 54, at 255-58.
292. See, e.g., Richard Blakehurst, Alice Enders & Joseph Francois, The Uruguay Round and
Market Access: Opportunities and Challenges for Developing Countries, paper presented to the
World Bank's Conference on the Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 26-27, 1995, at 23-24; see also Jackson, supra note 276, at 13 (viewing agriculture and textiles
as trade-offs for services and intellectual property rights).
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Agreement, 93 and of relief from unilateral trade sanctions in future discussions
of intellectual property protection. 294 The developing countries may also invoke
the transitional provisions previously mentioned, while LDCs may benefit from
longer transitional periods,295 special incentives favoring the transfer of technol-
ogy,2 96 and the prospect of future waivers to alleviate hardships stemming from
their obligations under the WTO Agreement as a whole.297
Meanwhile, the developed countries are unlikely to relax their efforts to elevate
international minimum standards of intellectual property protection even after
the TRIPS Agreement takes effect.299 In particular, they will press the developing
countries with regard to scope of protection issues not expressly covered in the
TRIPS Agreement, under the theory that both nonviolatory state actions and
changing circumstances can nullify and impair benefits otherwise conferred.299
Moreover, higher international minimum standards that developed countries es-
pouse in the course of harmonization exercises in other forums3°° will add to the
pressure on developing countries, on the grounds that emerging new standards
make it necessary further to reduce trade-distorting intellectual property practices.
These and other pressures concerning matters not yet covered by the TRIPS
Agreement, especially sui generis modes of protecting new technologies likely
to arise over time,3 ' could be exerted under article 71, which authorizes the
Council for TRIPS, established in article 68,302 "to undertake reviews in the
293. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 67.
294. See id. art. 64(1), incorporating by reference WTO Agreement, supra note 4, and GATT
1994, supra note 25, arts. XXII and XXIII; WTO Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 2, Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter Settlement of Disputes],
art. 23 ("Strengthening of the Multilateral System"); see also Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 465, 492-93 (1994); Hartridge & Subramanian, supra note 7, at 909.
295. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 65, 66(1); supra notes 47-50 and accompanying
text.
296. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 66(2), 67.
297. See supra note 49 (quoting WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XI(2)).
298. See, e.g., Doane, supra note 294, at 483-94; see also Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer,
GA7T Dispute Settlement Agreement: Internationalization or Elimination of Section 301?, 26 INT'L
LAW. 795, 800-01 (1992); Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY
ROUND, supra note 54, at 180, 197-203.
299. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 64(1) (invoking GATT 1994, supra note 25, arts.
XXII and XXIII); Settlement of Disputes, supra note 294, arts. 3(1), 26; see also ROBERT E. HUDEC,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
6-7, 144, 156-57, 160-61, 269 (1993); Victoria Curzon Price, New Institutional Developments in
GATT, 1 MINN. J. GLOBALTRADE 87, 92 (1992) (noting distinction between "violation" and "nonvio-
lation" disputes, which allows panel procedures "to apply to disputes arising from measures which
do not formally violate GATT, but which do injure the trading interests" of member countries).
300. See, e.g., Cordray, supra note 12 (discussing World Intellectual Property Organization's
(W.I.P.O.) proposed Patent Law Treaty); Doane, supra note 294, at 489-90 (discussing W.I.P.O.'s
proposed Protocol to the Berne Convention).
301. See, e.g., Doane, supra note 294, at 485-91; Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 99,
at 2426-29. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 6, at 2504-58.
302. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 68 (Council for TRIPS to monitor implementation),
69 (international cooperation), 71 (review and amendment).
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light of any new developments which might warrant modification or amendment
of the Agreement."-
30 3
In this context, the periodic reviews of the Council for TRIPS3°4 should, in
principle, substitute for the unilateral policy reviews currently undertaken by the
trade representatives of leading developed countries. 30 5 However, the extent to
which developed countries are truly prepared to forgo unilateral pressures under
provisions such as section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 remains to be
seen. 306 For example, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, which amends
section 301 ostensibly to conform to the WTO Agreement, continues to regard
a failure to provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights as an unreasonable act, policy, or practice "notwithstanding the fact that
the foreign country may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the
[TRIPS] Agreement. 30 7
To limit these pressures, the developing countries have obtained a morato-
rium on complaints of nullification or impairment due to nonviolatory acts or
changing circumstances for a period of five years. 30 8 In the long run, moreover,
developed countries pressing for higher standards of protection should expect
the developing countries to present counterclaims for the higher social costs
that such standards would entail. In other words, by shifting international
303. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 68, 71(1); see also id. art 69 (requiring parties "to
cooperate with a view to eliminating international trade in goods infringing intellectual property
rights"). For the ambiguities inherent in this use of the term "infringing," see Reichman, GATT
Connection, supra note 2, at 769-96. Formal amendments (but not necessarily modifications) appear
to require a consensus proposal from the Council for TRIPS, for action by a Ministerial Conference.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 71(2); WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. X(2),(3),(6)
(allowing less formal procedures for proposals under TRIPS Agreement, art. 71(2), but still subjecting
substantive amendments to acceptance of members); see also infra note 315.
304. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 71(2) (providing for two-year reviews of the
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement); WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. IV(5) (establishing
Council for TRIPS).
305. See, e.g., Doane, supra note 294, at 492-94 (discussing section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, as amended in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, infra note 306); Matsushita,
supra note 197, at 89-91 (expressing Japanese concerns about U.S. unilateral actions under § 301);
Judith H. Bello & Allan F. Holmer, "Special 301 ": Its Requirements, Implementation, and Signifi-
cance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (1989/90).
306. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1176-79, § 1302 (1989) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411) (amending § 301 of United States Trade
Act of 1974). For the most recent amendments to these provisions, see URAA, supra note 4,
§§ 311-314 (amending United States Trade Act of 1974, §§ 181-182, 301, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2242,
2411).
307. See URAA, supra note 4, § 314(c)(1) (amending Trade Act of 1974, supra note 306,
§ 301(d)(3)).
308. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 64(2) (suspending application of GATT 1994,
supra note 25, art. XXIII(l)(b), (c) to the settlement of TRIPS-related disputes for five years from
entry into force of the WTO Agreement, supra note 4). See also Settlement of Disputes, supra note
294, art. 26. But cf. Geller, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 5, at 109-10 (contending that
broad provisions of Paris and Berne Conventions, supra note 8, may sometimes be used to override
this moratorium).
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intellectual property protection to the framework of multilateral trade negotia-
tions, developed countries have implicitly acknowledged that compensation
has become the new master principle. 3°9 By the same token, offers of still
greater market access in the future could make it harder for developing coun-
tries to resist an emerging consensus in favor of higher world standards of
intellectual property protection.
B. UNCERTAINTIES OF THE DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Because trade concessions provided developing countries were partly ex-
changed for their acceptance of the TRIPS Agreement, the developed countries
want strict compliance with its standards (except, perhaps, when these standards
pinch their own feet). They also expect developing countries to implement its
obligations concerning domestic judicial and administrative enforcement of for-
eigners' intellectual property rights,"' including detailed provisions governing
the discovery of evidence, rights to counsel, injunctions, damages, and temporary
restraining orders.31
These provisions mean business.312 For the first time, they make it likely
that states will lodge actions against other states before duly constituted interna-
tional bodies, with a view to vindicating the privately owned intellectual prop-
erty rights of their citizens against unauthorized uses that occur outside the
domestic territorial jurisdictions.1 3 If the appropriate WTO panels ultimately
uphold such complaints, and the offending state fails to remove their underly-
ing causes after exhausting the new appeals procedure, the successful litigant
will become entitled to apply cross-sectoral retaliatory sanctions to offset the
economic loss resulting from nullification or impairment of the benefits to
which that state was entitled.31 a Moreover, the defendant state, after losing
on appeal, cannot block implementation of the panel's adverse decision, as
309. See, e.g., Malcolm D. Rowat, An Assessment of Intellectual Property Protection in LDCs
from both a Legal and Economic Perspective-Case Studies of Mexico, Chile and Argentina, 21
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 401, 429 (1993).
310. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Part III, sec. 1, art. 41(1) ("Members shall ensure
that enforcement procedures as specified . . . are available . . . so as to permit effective action
against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement"); supra
note 143 and accompanying text.
311. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 42-50 (civil matters), 61 (criminal procedures
for willful commercial trademark counterfeiting or "copyright piracy"). See also supra notes 144-48
and accompanying text (border control measures).
312. See, e.g., Doane, supra note 294, at 481-84; Geller, Introduction, supra note 150, § 5[5][b]
(stressing attempt "to make the private international law of copyright and the public international
law of trade work together").
313. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 64, 68; Settlement of Disputes, supra note 294,
arts. 6-21. For U.S. implementation, see URAA, supra note 4, §§ 121-130 ("Uruguay Round
Implementation and Dispute Settlement").
314. See supra note 313; Settlement of Disputes, supra note 294, arts. 3(7), 6-16 (panels), 17-20
(appellate review), 22 ("Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions").
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it could have done prior to the reformed dispute-settlement procedures adopted
in the WTO Agreement. 1 5
Before intellectual property owners begin dancing in the streets, however,
several negative factors must enter into the calculus of social costs and benefits
deriving from these provisions. To begin with, LDCs continue to enjoy differen-
tial and more favorable treatment, both within the TRIPS Agreement and within
the larger context of the Uruguay Round's Final Act as a whole,316 even though
such treatment was ostensibly denied to developing countries (and former socialist
countries) except as specifically provided by the TRIPS Agreement itself.317 In
this respect, the TRIPS Agreement envisions at least a two-tiered regime, if not
a three-tiered regime, given the favorable list of objectives and exceptions-
discussed below-that the developing countries may themselves still continue to
invoke.
LDCs may, of course, graduate to the less favorable status of developing
countries over time.319 Moreover, single LDCs can fully benefit from differential
and more favorable treatment only so long as they go about their domestic affairs
without engaging in wholesale appropriation of foreign intellectual creations,
especially acts of counterfeiting or copycat duplication that systematically violate
international minimum standards and affect trade on export markets. In other
words, LDCs that do not engage in wholesale piracy that distorts international
trade need not incur the social costs of higher intellectual property regimes until
they can objectively afford them. 320 But LDCs that tolerate aggressive piratical
practices affecting international trade risk eliciting complaints of nonviolatory
315. See Settlement of Disputes, supra note 294, art. 22(6), (7) (failing other measures, including
negotiated settlement, panel (or duly appointed substitute) becomes arbitrator, and arbitrator's decision
becomes binding, including "authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations . . . unless
the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] decides by consensus to reject the request"). While WTO
Agreement, supra note 4, art. IX(I), reaffirms the principle of decision making by consensus, as
does URAA, supra note 4, § 122(a), this pertains to matters before the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council, see WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. IV(I), (2), but not to the provisions
of the dispute settlement machinery as such. See also URAA, supra note 4, § 123(e)(f) (requiring
consultation with congressional committees before changing U.S. act or regulation found inconsistent
with WTO Agreement; but any committee vote "shall not be binding on the department or agency
• . . implementing the [changed] rule or other modification" (§ 213(f)(1)(3)).
316. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 66(1); Settlement of Disputes, supra note
294, art. 24; see also WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XI(2) (quoted supra note 49); Ministerial
Decisions and Declarations, Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries, adopted
by Trade Negotiations Committee, Dec. 15, 1993, in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra
note 4, at 440-41.
317. See Reichman, TRIPS Component, supra note 2, at 259-61.
318. See, e.g., Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 2, at 861-83 (predicting that ultimate
solution would require a two- or three-tiered regime).
319. See WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XI(2) (benefitting only LDCs "recognized as such
by the United Nations").
320. See supra note 316.
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acts of nullification and impairment, once the five-year moratorium against such
complaints expires within the framework of article 64.32
With respect to actions for nullification or impairment lodged against devel-
oping countries (and former socialist countries), as distinct from LDCs, they are
supposedly immune from demands for differential and more favorable treatment
not grounded in specific provisions of the TRIPS Agreement itself or in the new
rules concerning settlement of disputes.322 In reality, the developing countries
will have ample opportunity to show excusing circumstances that require consider-
ation of their particular economic problems,323 especially within the framework
of the objectives set out in article 7 and of the public-interest exceptions set out
in article 8.324 As noted, article 7 declares that the "protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obliga-
tions. ""' Article 8(1) further specifies that parties may defend "the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological develop-
ment. - 326
Predicting the outcome of litigation between a developed and a developing
country would be risky under the best of circumstances, and the likelihood that
WTO panels would in fact ignore the special circumstances of any developing
country (other than newly industrialized countries that had graduated to a higher
level) seems speculative, indeed. For this and other reasons, the path of wisdom
for all sides is to settle disputes arising under the TRIPS Agreement by negotiated
compromises that take a developing country's good-faith efforts to implement
its TRIPS obligations into account.
From a long-term perspective, the integration of private intellectual property
rights into international economic law should stimulate governments in devel-
oping countries to formulate strategies of competition that are consistent with
the new legal order and to foster and reward entrepreneurship in general.327
Similarly, entrepreneurs operating from developing countries must learn to
321. See supra notes 299 & 308 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 316; Settlement of Disputes, supra note 294, art. 12(11) (requiring panel
reports, when at least one party to the dispute is a developing country, to "explicitly indicate the
form in which account has been taken of relevant provisions on differential and more-favorable
treatment . . . that form part of the covered agreements which have been raised by the developing
country . . . in the course of the dispute settlement procedures" (emphasis supplied)).
323. See generally Reichman, TRIPS Component, supra note 2, at 258-61.
324. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 7, 8.
325. Id. art. 7.
326. Id. art 8(1).
327. While "the developing countries will have to work harder to compete in general, and to
acquire technological improvements in particular, under a post-TRIPS regime, . . any competitive
efforts that yield a foothold in the world market, and any effective transfer of technology . . ., should
yield greater potential returns than at present." Reichman, TRIPS Component, supra note 2, at 264.
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emulate the practices of small- and medium-sized firms in the developed coun-
tries that routinely compete with giant transnational corporations. Over time,
the affinities between small- and medium-sized firms in both developed and
developing countries are likely to outweigh the affinities between small and
large firms operating within any single national territory, and this commonality
of interests should strengthen the role of developing counties in future multilat-
eral negotiations.
Meanwhile, if past practice is a reliable indicator, many protracted disputes
under the TRIPS Agreement will pit developed countries against other devel-
oped countries, and in such cases no defenses sounding in hardship or the
need for preferential treatment will lie. In this respect, the developed countries
seem to have embarked upon a bold new journey of discovery without any
clear idea of where it will carry them in the end. For example, policy makers
in states traditionally allergic to even the loose constraints of public interna-
tional law seem unaware of the extent to which their trade negotiators have
exposed them to decisions about intellectual property matters by beefed-up
WTO panels, decisions that "could become binding internationally, whether
or not consistent with the domestic laws of the litigating states, and whether
or not palatable to their respective Chambers of Commerce or to their legisla-
tive and administrative authorities." 32 ' There is reason to fear (or hope, de-
pending on one's perspective) that these WTO panels will find it necessary
(or merely tempting) to fill well-known gaps in international intellectual prop-
erty law that could affect the domestic systems in ways that local legislatures
and administrators might regret.329
Given the protectionist bias currently driving international intellectual property
relations and the ability of oligopolists to capture their respective trade agencies,
one has little confidence that the WTO panels summoned to adjudicate intellectual
property disputes will overly concern themselves with the public interest of the
international community as a whole in limiting barriers to entry and other anticom-
petitive effects likely to flow from the TRIPS Agreement. The evolution of this
revised dispute resolution machinery through case-by-case decisions will thus
merit constant attention by all those economic actors-in developed and devel-
oping countries alike-whose long-term fortunes depend on a proper balance
between incentives to create and free competition.
328. Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 2, at 861. On the other hand, binding international
decisions make it harder for local authorities to bend to special interests seeking to undo free-trade
agreements. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State:
A GATT's Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1405-06, 1445
(1994).
329. See, e.g., Geller, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 5, at 107-14.
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